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The lender of last resort concept: from Bagehot to the crisis of 2007

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  • Jeffers, Esther

Abstract

La crise qui s’est développée à partir de l’été 2007 nous offre l’opportunité d’étudier l’un des piliers de la théorie économique : le prêteur en dernier ressort. Dans notre papier nous commençons par examiner sur le plan théorique le concept de prêteur en dernier ressort ainsi que les principes qui le gouvernent. Nous essayons ensuite de comprendre la nature de la crise ainsi que sa gestion du point de vue du PDR en Europe et aux États-Unis. Nous analysons les difficultés majeures rencontrées et tirons les principales leçons quant à l’action du prêteur en dernier ressort dans une économie mondialisée.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffers, Esther, 2010. "The lender of last resort concept: from Bagehot to the crisis of 2007," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 8.
    • Handle: RePEc:rvr:journl:2010:8903
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Claudio Borio & Anna Zabai, 2018. "Unconventional monetary policies: a re-appraisal," Chapters, in: Peter Conti-Brown & Rosa M. Lastra (ed.), Research Handbook on Central Banking, chapter 20, pages 398-444, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. repec:bla:jecsur:v:20:y:2006:i:3:p:459-482 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Paul Hoffman & Anthony M. Santomero, 1998. "Problem Bank Resolution: Evaluating the Options," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 98-05, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    4. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 1996. "Interbank lending and systemic risk," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 733-765.
    5. Mr. Charles Enoch, 1997. "Transparency and Ambiguity in Central Bank Safety Net Operations," IMF Working Papers 1997/138, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Thomas M. Humphrey, 1989. "Lender of last resort: the concept in history," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 75(Mar), pages 8-16.
    7. Viral V. Acharya & Denis Gromb & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2012. "Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 184-217, April.
    8. Xavier Freixas & Curzio Giannini & Glenn Hoggarth & Farouk Soussa, 2000. "Lender of Last Resort: What Have We Learned Since Bagehot?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 18(1), pages 63-84, October.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Víctor A. Beker, 2020. "How to prevent a new global financial crisis," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4309, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banque centrale; crise systémique; prêteur en dernier ressort; Central bank; Lender of last resort; systemic crisis; Banco central; crisis sistémica; prestamista de última instancia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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