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Action du prêteur en dernier ressort : qu’avons-nous appris lors de cette crise ?

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  • Esther Jeffers

Abstract

[eng] Lender of Last Resort Intervention : What Have We Learned from the Crisis ? . The scope and speed of the interventions undertaken to prevent the failure of financial institutions in the current crisis have no historical precedents. At the heart of the measures taken has been the concept of lender of last resort (LLR), a time-honored pillar of classical economic theory. Faced with an imminent threat of systemic collapse, the various authorities intervened in a massive and often precipitated manner. To what extent did these interventions heed theoretical principles or, on the contrary, diverge from those principles ? The purpose of this article is therefore to recall LLR doctrine and how it has evolved, examine the current crisis from the LLR standpoint, review how LLRs managed the crisis and draw the initial lessons. . Classification JEL : E58, G28 [fre] L'ampleur et le rythme des interventions pour prévenir la faillite d'institutions financières dans la crise actuelle sont sans précédent dans l'histoire. Au coeur de ces actions se retrouve la notion du prêteur en dernier ressort (PDR), concept fort ancien dans la théorie économique classique. Face à la menace imminente d'un effondrement systémique, les autorités sont intervenues de façon massive et parfois précipitée. On peut se demander dans quelle mesure ces interventions respectaient les principes dictés par la théorie et, au contraire, dans quelle mesure elles s'en sont écartées. L'objet de cet article est donc de rappeler la doctrine du PDR et son évolution, d'examiner la crise actuelle du point de vue du PDR, de faire le point sur la gestion de cette crise par le PDR et d'en tirer les leçons provisoires. . Classification JEL : E58, G28

Suggested Citation

  • Esther Jeffers, 2009. "Action du prêteur en dernier ressort : qu’avons-nous appris lors de cette crise ?," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 94(1), pages 241-249.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2009_num_94_1_5305
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2009.5305
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2009.5305
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas M. Humphrey, 1989. "Lender of last resort: the concept in history," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 75(Mar), pages 8-16.
    2. Goodhart, C.A.E., 2008. "The regulatory response to the financial crisis," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 351-358, December.
    3. Paul Hoffman & Anthony M. Santomero, 1998. "Problem Bank Resolution: Evaluating the Options," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 98-05, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    4. Hyman P. Minsky, 1985. "Money and the Lender of Last Resort," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(1), pages 12-18, March.
    5. Xavier Freixas & Curzio Giannini & Glenn Hoggarth & Farouk Soussa, 2000. "Lender of Last Resort: What Have We Learned Since Bagehot?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 18(1), pages 63-84, October.
    6. Charles A. E. Goodhart, 2008. "The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis," CESifo Working Paper Series 2257, CESifo.
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    Cited by:

    1. François Facchini, 2010. "2007 : une crise systémique ?," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 97(2), pages 155-183.
    2. François Facchini, 2010. "2007 : une crise systémique ?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00480066, HAL.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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