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L’impresa tra dirigismo e mercato

Author

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  • Stefano Micossi

    (Assonime, Roma e College of Europe, Bruges)

Abstract

This essay discusses the endemic weaknesses of Italian industry in a historical as well as analytical perspective. The main conclusion is that these weaknesses may not be determined by some hereditary shortcomings of character and skill of our entrepreneurial class, but rather by the economic and social policies that have been followed since the Constituent Assembly. In particular, the prevailing small size and strong concentration of ownership could mainly be a consequence of labour market rules introduced at the end of the 1960s, as well as the economic and social policies followed in order to permit those rules to survive, despite their inconsistency with the changing competitive environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefano Micossi, 2006. "L’impresa tra dirigismo e mercato," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 96(4), pages 13-48, July-Augu.
    • Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:96:y:2006:i:4:p:13-48
    as

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    File URL: http://www.rivistapoliticaeconomica.it/2006/lug_ago/Micossi.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L53 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Enterprise Policy
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • P12 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Enterprises
    • P47 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Performance and Prospects

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