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Risk-sharing e architettura istituzionale delle politiche di stabilizzazione nell'UME: aspetti metodologici e verifica empirica

Author

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  • Davide Furceri

    (Università di Palermo)

Abstract

Questo lavoro analizza l’efficacia relativa di due possibili contesti di riferimento della futura azione di politica economica in ambito europeo in termini di obiettivi di stabilizzazione: il primo, caratterizzato dall’attuale architettura istituzionale e il secondo, da un sistema fiscale di tipo federale, o da un forte coordinamento delle politiche fiscali. Ciò allo scopo di evidenziare differenze tra i due schemi e fornire valide indicazioni di politica economica che siano supportate dall’analisi empirica. I risultati mostrano che il secondo schema assorbe perfettamente eventuali shock, mentre il primo non assorbe una quota di shock che varia tra il 51% ed il 73%.

Suggested Citation

  • Davide Furceri, 2002. "Risk-sharing e architettura istituzionale delle politiche di stabilizzazione nell'UME: aspetti metodologici e verifica empirica," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 92(6), pages 175-210, November-.
    • Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:92:y:2002:i:6:p:175-210
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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