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Model For Revelation Of Unfriendly Information Impacts In Mass-Media Which Are Directed On Change Of Public Opinion

Author

Listed:
  • Viktor BOCHARNIKOV

    (Consulting Group INEX-FT, 03011 Desjatinnaja str 13a, 2, Kiev, Ukraine)

  • Sergey SVESHNIKOV

    (Consulting Group INEX-FT, 03011 Desjatinnaja str 13a, 2, Kiev, Ukraine)

  • Stepan VOZNYAK

    (Consulting Group INEX-FT, 03011 Desjatinnaja str 13a, 2, Kiev, Ukraine)

  • Vladimir YUZEFOVICH

    (Consulting Group INEX-FT, 03011 Desjatinnaja str 13a, 2, Kiev, Ukraine)

Abstract

In this article we propose the mathematical model for revelation of deliberate unfriendly information impacts which are fulfilled by means of specially prepared information messages (news, reviews and others) in mass-media. The model calculates the quantitative measure for fact determination of purposeful information impact and evaluation of potential damage to interests of state (party, corporation) from impact fulfilment. The model use the following data: intensity and direction of information streams (publication frequency and themes of news), structure of important state and public problems, structure of social groups of a society, priorities of these social groups, mass-media popularity in social groups, priorities of a state policy. The model is the semantic network in which the relations between concepts we formalize by use of fuzzy measures by Sugeno. We have used this model for revelation of information impacts on public opinion of Russian-speaking national minority of Crimea (Ukraine) during 01.2002 - 02.2005 (final stage of presidential elections). The model also can has important implications for evaluation of election cleanness, for neutralization of dirty voting technologies, for facts determination of unfair competition, when corporations involve a public opinion into own competitive activity.

Suggested Citation

  • Viktor BOCHARNIKOV & Sergey SVESHNIKOV & Stepan VOZNYAK & Vladimir YUZEFOVICH, 2010. "Model For Revelation Of Unfriendly Information Impacts In Mass-Media Which Are Directed On Change Of Public Opinion," Management Research and Practice, Research Centre in Public Administration and Public Services, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 2(1), pages 21-38, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:rom:mrpase:v:2:y:2010:i:1:p:21-38
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lohmann, Susanne, 1993. "A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(2), pages 319-333, June.
    2. Gartner, Scott Sigmund, 2008. "The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War: An Experimental Approach," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 102(1), pages 95-106, February.
    3. Koster, M. & Lindelauf, R. & Lindner, I. & Owen, G., 2008. "Mass-mobilization with noisy conditional beliefs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 55-77, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public opinion; information impact; fuzzy measures; mathematical model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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