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Sequential Auctions: Theory and Evidence from the Seattle Fur Exchange

Author

Listed:
  • Val Lambson

    (Brigham Young University)

  • Norman K Thurston

    (Utah Department of Health)

Abstract

We develop a model that incorporates salient features of the Seattle Fur Exchange: identical lots of furs are auctioned sequentially, bids must be raised by specified increments, and the winner of a lot has the privilege of beginning the bidding on the subsequent lot. Predictions of the theory are consistent with the data. Revenue implications of the theory are also explored.

Suggested Citation

  • Val Lambson & Norman K Thurston, 2006. "Sequential Auctions: Theory and Evidence from the Seattle Fur Exchange," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 70-80, Spring.
  • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:1:p:70-80
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Csoka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2022. "Centralized clearing mechanisms: A programming approach," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 7(1), pages 45-69, December.
    2. Eaves, James & Williams, Jeffrey & Power, Gabriel J., 2016. "Do traders strategically time their pledges during real-world Walrasian auctions?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 109-118.
    3. Rosato, Antonio, 2023. "Loss aversion in sequential auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
    4. El Hadi Caoui & GĂ©rard Marty, 2023. "Random drawing in sequential auctions: investigating the role of a market device in timber sales," Review of Agricultural, Food and Environmental Studies, Springer, vol. 104(2), pages 101-122, June.
    5. Timothy N. Cason & Karthik N. Kannan & Ralph Siebert, 2011. "An Experimental Study of Information Revelation Policies in Sequential Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(4), pages 667-688, April.
    6. Kannan, Karthik N., 2010. "Declining prices in sequential auctions with complete revelation of bids," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 49-51, July.
    7. Rosato, Antonio, 2014. "Loss Aversion in Sequential Auctions: Endogenous Interdependence, Informational Externalities and the "Afternoon Effect"," MPRA Paper 56824, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Ola Andersson & Tommy Andersson, 2017. "Timing and presentation effects in sequential auctions," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 2(1), pages 39-55, December.
    9. Brennan C. Platt & Joseph Price & Henry Tappen, 2010. "Pay-to-Bid Auctions," NBER Working Papers 15695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Waterson, Michael & Wojciechowska , Olga, 2024. "Individual bidder behaviour in repeated auctions," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1498, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    11. Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2021. "Sequential auctions with ambiguity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    12. Vishnu V. Narayan & Enguerrand Prebet & Adrian Vetta, 2019. "The Declining Price Anomaly is not Universal in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions (but almost is)," Papers 1905.00853, arXiv.org.

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