IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/rje/randje/v31y2000ispringp145-164.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Incentive Auctions and Information Revelation

Author

Listed:
  • Gary Biglaiser
  • Claudio Mezzetti

Abstract

We study an incentive auction in which multiple principals bid for the exclusive services, or effort, of a single agent. Each principal has private information about her valuation for these services, and the agent has private information about his disutility of providing them. We characterize the equilibrium of this auction and examine the agent's incentives to reveal information about his type. We show that the effort level taken by the agent is smaller than in the standard auction for a known agent type and greater than in the single-principal, single-agent model. Additionally, inexperienced analysts are less likely to issue timely forecasts, and they revise their forecasts more frequently. These findings are broadly consistent with existing career concern motivated herding theories.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary Biglaiser & Claudio Mezzetti, 2000. "Incentive Auctions and Information Revelation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(1), pages 145-164, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:31:y:2000:i:spring:p:145-164
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Byoung Jun & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2014. "Security bid auctions for agency contracts," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(4), pages 289-319, December.
    2. Michela Cella & Federico Etro, 2016. "Contract competition between hierarchies, managerial compensation and imperfectly correlated shocks," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 118(3), pages 193-218, July.
    3. Barigozzi, Francesca & Cremer, Helmuth, 2024. "Shining with the stars: Competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 250-283.
    4. Johannes Becker & Andrea Schneider, 2019. "Bidding for Firms with Unknown Characteristics," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(3), pages 1222-1243, July.
    5. Sengupta, Rajdeep, 2007. "Foreign entry and bank competition," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 502-528, May.
    6. John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2008. "Properties of scoring auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 69-85, March.
    7. Johannes Becker, 2021. "Second-Best Source-Based Taxation of Multinational Firms," CESifo Working Paper Series 9329, CESifo.
    8. Ahmed, Rafayal, 2018. "Dynamic Screening with Differentially Informed Principals," MPRA Paper 118463, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Barigozzi, Francesca & Burani, Nadia, 2019. "Competition for talent when firms' mission matters," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 128-151.
    10. Burani, Nadia & Mantovani, Andrea, 2020. "Non-linear pricing and conscious consumption," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:31:y:2000:i:spring:p:145-164. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.rje.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.