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Intertemporal Mixed Bundling and Buying Frenzies

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  • Patrick DeGraba
  • Rafi Mohammed

Abstract

By initially selling goods only in bundles and subsequently selling unsold units individually, a multiproduct seller can create a buying frenzy in which his profit is higher than it would be if he sold all units individually at their market clearing prices. In this frenzy, high-valuation customers buy a bundle because they expect quantity rationing when units are sold individually. Their purchases reduce the quantity to be sold individually, causing the shortages that result in rationing. The bundle's price exceeds the sum of the individual prices, a fact observed in markets for rock concert tickets.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick DeGraba & Rafi Mohammed, 1999. "Intertemporal Mixed Bundling and Buying Frenzies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(4), pages 694-718, Winter.
    • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:30:y:1999:i:winter:p:694-718
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew J. Drake & Serhan Duran & Paul M. Griffin & Julie L. Swann, 2008. "Optimal timing of switches between product sales for sports and entertainment tickets," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(1), pages 59-75, February.
    2. Karp, L & Perloff, Jeffrey M, 2005. "When promoters like scalpers," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt2wp8m52z, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    3. Karp, Larry & Perloff, Jeffrey M., 2003. "When Promoters Like Scalpers," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt52d579j4, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    4. J.-P. Niinimäki, 2023. "Experience Goods, Umbrella Branding, and Reputation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 62(1), pages 33-44, February.
    5. Larry Karp & Jeffrey M. Perloff, 2005. "When Promoters Like Scalpers," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 477-508, June.
    6. Ashutosh Prasad & R. Venkatesh & Vijay Mahajan, 2017. "Temporal product bundling with myopic and strategic consumers: Manifestations and relative effectiveness," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 341-368, December.
    7. Henk Folmer & Auke Leen, 2013. "Why do successful restaurants not raise their prices?," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 81-90, July.
    8. Jones, Steven L. & Yeoman, John C., 2009. "The promoter's role in ticket pricing: Implications of real options for optimal posted prices and rationing," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 62(11), pages 1187-1192, November.
    9. Sreya Kolay & Rajeev K. Tyagi, 2022. "Optimal Bundling of Events," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(2), pages 380-400, March.
    10. Robert Innes & Stephen F. Hamilton, 2009. "Vertical restraints and horizontal control," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 120-143, March.

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