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Cable Franchise Renewals: Do Incumbent Firms Behave Opportunistically?

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  • Mark A. Zupan

Abstract

Systematic empirical evidence has heretofore been lacking on the extent to which supplier opportunism at the time of contract renewal is a fundamental problem associated with franchise bidding schemes. At least for the case of local cable television distribution, this article suggests several theoretical reasons why bad behavior by an incumbent supplier may be the exception rather than the rule and a simple test for supplier opportunism at the time of franchise renewal. The simple test is employed to empirically analyze the terms of trade in a cross-sectional sample of recent cable franchise renewal contracts

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  • Mark A. Zupan, 1989. "Cable Franchise Renewals: Do Incumbent Firms Behave Opportunistically?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 473-482, Winter.
    • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:20:y:1989:i:winter:p:473-482
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    Cited by:

    1. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
    2. Luc Baumstark & Claude Ménard & William Roy & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2005. "Modes de gestion et efficience des opérateurs dans le secteur des transports urbains de personnes," Post-Print halshs-00103116, HAL.
    3. Sorana, V., 2003. "Competitive Procurement and Asset Specificity," Other publications TiSEM 2312e3b7-7ed0-4aa8-ab56-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Iossa, Elisabetta & Waterson, Michael, 2019. "Maintaining competition in recurrent procurement contracts: A case study on the London bus market," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 141-149.
    5. Eshien Chong & Freddy Huet & Stéphane Saussier, 2006. "Auctions, Ex Post Competition And Prices: The Efficiency Of Public‐Private Partnerships," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(4), pages 521-554, December.
    6. Gregory S. Crawford, 2015. "The economics of television and online video markets," ECON - Working Papers 197, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    7. Hakam Kamleh, 2005. "La nouvelle organisation ferroviaire britannique : sur la frontière entre intégration et désintégration," CAE Working Papers 28, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
    8. Crawford, Gregory, 2015. "The Economics of Television and Online Video Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 10676, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
    10. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
    11. Sorana, V., 2003. "Competitive Procurement and Asset Specificity," Discussion Paper 2003-96, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    12. Nicolas Dupas & Frédéric Marty & Arnaud Voisin, 2011. "Partnership contracts, project finance and information asymmetries: from competition for the contract to competition within the contract?," Post-Print halshs-00202327, HAL.

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