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Public Regulation of National Securities Exchanges: A Test of the Capture Hypothesis

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  • G. William Schwert

Abstract

This paper tests the hypothesis that members of national securities exchanges have received net benefits from the regulatory activities of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The prices of stock exchange seats are analyzed in time periods of major changes in the regulation of the securities industry during the 1926-1972 period. Time series regression models are used to identify changes in seat prices which are unrelated to changes in stock prices or share trading volume. Empirical analysis of the unexpected changes in seat prices indicates that the most important regulatory change occurred in March, 1934, when the Securities and Exchange Act was first considered by Congress; both New York and American Stock Exchange seat prices fell unexpectedly by about 50 percent in one month. There is no evidence that this capital loss was ever recouped after March, 1934. There is also evidence that recent changes in the fixed commission rate structure of the brokerage industry have had a negative impact on seat prices. Thus, there is evidence which contradicts the hypothesis that securities brokers have benefited by capturing control of the regulators of the securities industry.

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  • G. William Schwert, 1977. "Public Regulation of National Securities Exchanges: A Test of the Capture Hypothesis," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 128-150, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:8:y:1977:i:spring:p:128-150
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    Cited by:

    1. Davis, Lance E. & Neal, Larry & White, Eugene, 2007. "The Highest Price Ever: The Great NYSE Seat Sale of 1928–1929 and Capacity Constraints," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 705-739, September.
    2. Jingyun Ma & Fengming Song & Zhishu Yang, 2010. "The dual role of the government: securities market regulation in China 1980‐2007," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 18(2), pages 158-177, May.
    3. Dongmin Kong & Junyi Xiang & Jian Zhang & Yiyang Lu, 2019. "Politically connected independent directors and corporate fraud in China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 58(5), pages 1347-1383, March.
    4. Raymond Brastow & David Rystrom, 1988. "Wealth Effects of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 32(2), pages 59-65, October.
    5. Dino Falaschetti, 2008. "Can Lobbying Prevent Anticompetitive Outcomes? Evidence On Consumer Monopsony In Telecommunications," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(4), pages 1065-1096.
    6. Battalio, Robert & Hatch, Brian & Loughran, Tim, 2011. "Who benefited from the disclosure mandates of the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1047-1063, September.
    7. William McEachern, 1987. "Federal advisory commissions in an economic model of representative democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 41-62, January.
    8. Lawrence J. White, "undated". "Technological Change, Financial Innovation, and Financial Regulation: The Challenges for Public Policy," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 97-33, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    9. Harold Mulherin, J., 2007. "Measuring the costs and benefits of regulation: Conceptual issues in securities markets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 421-437, June.
    10. Muhammad Zubair Mumtaz & Zachary Alexander Smith, 2021. "Analyzing the duration of IPOs from offering to listing using the Cox proportional hazards model," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 20(1), pages 5-43, January.
    11. Barry Weingast, 1984. "The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 147-191, January.
    12. Richard Barke & William Riker, 1982. "A political theory of regulation with some observations on railway abandonments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 73-106, January.

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