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The Effect of Lagged Regulation in an Averch-Johnson Model

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  • Elizabeth E. Bailey
  • Roger D. Coleman

Abstract

The analysis seeks to determine the impact of lagged regulation on a profit-maximizing firm subject to a rate-of-return constraint. We are particularly interested in the effect of lag on the accomplishment of two regulatory goals: minimum-cost production, and an output greater than that of an unconstrained monopoly. The extend to which these goals are reached depends on whether the fair rate of return is equal to the cost of capital or somewhat higher. If the two are equal, lagged regulation accomplishes both goals; this contrasts sharply with continuous regulation, where the firm is indifferent among all methods of production or levels of output that let it break even in its operations. If the rate of return is above the cost of capital, it will not always pay for the firm to alter its resource allocation from the overcapitalized level indicated by Averch and Johnson. There will, however, be some length of the lag interval above which the firm will overcapitalize by successively smaller amounts, with attendant increases in output from the Averch-Johnson level.

Suggested Citation

  • Elizabeth E. Bailey & Roger D. Coleman, 1971. "The Effect of Lagged Regulation in an Averch-Johnson Model," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 278-292, Spring.
  • Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:2:y:1971:i:spring:p:278-292
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Louis Alessi, 1974. "Aneconomic analysis of government ownership and reculation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 1-42, September.
    2. Ingo Vogelsang, 2012. "Incentive Regulation, Investments and Technological Change," Chapters, in: Gerald R. Faulhaber & Gary Madden & Jeffrey Petchey (ed.), Regulation and the Performance of Communication and Information Networks, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Sumit K. Majumdar, 2010. "Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design And Firm Growth: Experiences From Telecommunications Sector Regulation," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 81(3), pages 357-387, September.
    4. Mirucki, Jean, 1980. "Vérification des conditions d'efficacité dans la production chez Bell Canada [Checking the conditions of efficient production in Bell Canada]," MPRA Paper 30147, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 1980.
    5. Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 925-972, December.
    6. Emeka T. Nwaeze, 1998. "Public Utility Regulation in the US and Asymmetric Return Responses to Positive and Negative Abnormal Earnings," Multinational Finance Journal, Multinational Finance Journal, vol. 2(4), pages 269-293, December.
    7. Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, 1981. "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in Public Regulation, pages 1-78, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. David P. Baron & Raymond R. De Bondt, 1980. "Factor Price Changes," Discussion Papers 417, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    9. Mirucki, Jean, 1980. "Comportement de l'entreprise réglementée: étude de l'hypothèse Averch-Johnson [Behavior of the Regulated Firm: A Study of the Averch-Johnson Hypothesis]," MPRA Paper 27669, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 1982.
    10. William P. Rogerson, 1989. "Optimal Depreciation Schedules for Regulated Utilities," Discussion Papers 852, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    11. John E. Kwoka, 1993. "Implementing price cops in telecommunications," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(4), pages 726-752.
    12. George Briden & Jonathan Lesser, 2017. "Regulatory arbitrage and the FERC rate settlement process," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 184-196, April.
    13. Sumit K. Majumdar & Rabih Moussawi & Ulku Yaylacicegi, 2019. "Mergers and Wages in Digital Networks: a Public Interest Perspective," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 583-615, December.
    14. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18946 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Emeka T. Nwaeze, 1998. "Regulation and the Valuation Relevance of Book Value and Earnings: Evidence from the United States," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(4), pages 547-573, December.
    16. Majumdar, Sumit K., 2010. "Institutional changes, firm size and wages in the telecommunications sector," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 201-217, July.
    17. Diekmann, Jochen & Leprich, Uwe & Ziesing, Hans-Joachim, 2007. "Regulierung der Stromnetze in Deutschland: Ökonomische Anreize für Effizienz und Qualität einer zukunftsfähigen Netzinfrastruktur," Study / edition der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Düsseldorf, volume 127, number 187, March.
    18. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
    19. Guthrie, Graeme, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Working Paper Series 18946, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    20. Majumdar, Sumit K., 2016. "Debt and communications technology diffusion: Retrospective evidence," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 458-474.

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