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Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry

Author

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  • H. Lutz, Stefan

    (Purdue University and ZEI)

Abstract

In a model of vertical product differentiation, duopolistic firms face qualitydependent costs and compete in quality and price in two segmented markets. Minimum quality standards, set uniformly or according to the principle of Mutual Recognition, can be used to increase welfare. The analysis includes entry deterrence by the choice of a particular standard. With identical costs, both industries remain in the market under either regulatory alternative. Mutual Recognition is the optimal policy choice for either region. With signifi - cantly different costs, the Full-Harmonization outcome includes only one firm and leads to a maximal sum of regional welfares.

Suggested Citation

  • H. Lutz, Stefan, 2000. "Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 15, pages 314-344.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:integr:0135
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. T.Huw Edwards, 2007. "Horizontal Regulatory Protection. Its appeal and implictions in a linear Cournot duopoly," Discussion Paper Series 2007_05, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Feb 2007.
    2. Ian Sheldon & Brian Roe, 2008. "Vertical product differentiation and credence goods: Mandatory labeling and gains from international integration," EconoQuantum, Revista de Economia y Finanzas, Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas, Departamento de Metodos Cuantitativos y Maestria en Economia., vol. 5(1), pages 9-33, Julio-Dic.
    3. Lutz, Stefan, 2005. "Regulatory standards can lead to predation," ZEI Working Papers B 05-2005, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    4. Stefan Lutz & Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003. "Mutual Recognition of National Minimum Quality Standards may Support International Convergence," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 293-311, December.
    5. T.Huw Edwards, 2009. "Regulatory Protection When Firms Move First," Discussion Paper Series 2009_19, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Nov 2009.
    6. Pei‐Cheng Liao, 2008. "A Note On Market Coverage In Vertical Differentiation Models With Fixed Costs," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(1), pages 27-44, January.
    7. Werner Smolny, 2003. "Determinants of innovation behaviour and investment estimates for west-german manufacturing firms," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(5), pages 449-463.
    8. Naoto Jinji & Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2010. "Strategic R&D Policy in a Quality-Differentiated Industry with More than Two Exporting Countries," Discussion papers e-09-001, Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University.
    9. Huw Edwards & Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 2013. "Regulatory Protection When Firms Decide First on Technical Collaboration and R&D," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 750-764, September.
    10. Stefan Lutz & Mario Pezzino, 2012. "International Strategic Choice of Minimum Quality Standards and Welfare," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 594-613, July.
    11. Alberto AMURGO PACHECO, 2006. "Mutual Recognition Agreements and Trade Diversion: Consequences for Developing Nations," IHEID Working Papers 20-2006, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised Jun 2007.
    12. Stéphan Marette, 2007. "Minimum safety standard, consumers’ information and competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 259-285, December.
    13. Lutz, Stefan & Turrini, Alessandro, 1999. "Skills, labour costs and vertically differentiated industries: A general equilibrium analysis," ZEI Working Papers B 26-1999, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    14. S Lutz, 2005. "Can a Tariff on Foreign Competition Harm the Domestic Industry?," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0510, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    15. Jinji, Naoto & Toshimitsu, Tsuyoshi, 2013. "Strategic R&D policy in a quality-differentiated industry with three exporting countries," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 132-142.
    16. Giulio ECCHIA & Luca LAMBERTINI, 2001. "Endogenous Timing and Quality Standards in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2001021, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    17. Marco Trombetta, 2003. "International regulation of audit quality: full harmonization or mutual recognition? An economic approach," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(1), pages 3-27.
    18. Jørgen Hansen & Jørgen Nielsen, 2009. "Dumping and Injury Margins in Markets with Horizontal as well as Vertical Product Differentiation," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 233-250, September.
    19. Wolfgang Kerber & Roger Van den Bergh, 2008. "Mutual Recognition Revisited: Misunderstandings, Inconsistencies, and a Suggested Reinterpretation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 447-465, August.
    20. Sheldon, Ian M. & Roe, Brian E., 2008. "Vertical Differentiation and Credence Goods: Harmonized Labeling and Gains from International Integration," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6340, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    21. Munirul H. Nabin & Xuan Nguyen & Pasquale M. Sgro, 2013. "Technology Transfer, Quality Standards, and North–South Trade," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 783-796, September.
    22. Sang-Ho Lee & Ram Kumar Phuyal, 2013. "Strategic Entry Deterrence by Limiting Qualities under Minimum Quality Standards," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 64(4), pages 550-563, December.
    23. Lutz, Stefan & Turrini, Alessandro, 2006. "A general equilibrium model with vertically differentiated industries, skilled labour and trade," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-19, January.
    24. T. Huw Edwards, 2004. "Trade and Strategic Regulatory Bias in Monopolistic Industries," Discussion Paper Series 2004-21, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Sep 2004.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    product differentiation; oligopoly; trade; quality standards; entry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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