IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/rfa/journl/v9y2021i2p79-88.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Positionality-Weighted Aggregation Methods for Cumulative Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Takeshi Kato
  • Yasuhiro Asa
  • Misa Owa

Abstract

Respecting minority opinions is vital in solving social problems. However, minority opinions are often ignored in general majority rules. To build consensus on pluralistic values and make social choices that consider minority opinions, we propose aggregation methods that give weighting to the minority's positionality on cardinal cumulative voting. Based on quadratic and linear voting, we formulated three weighted aggregation methods that differ in the ratio of votes to cumulative points and the weighting of the minority to all members, and assuming that the distributions of votes follow normal distributions, we calculated the frequency distributions of the aggregation results. We found that minority opinions are more likely to be reflected proportionately to the average of the distribution in two of the above three methods. This implies that Sen and Gotoh's idea of considering the social position of unfortunate people on ordinal ranking in the welfare economics, was illustrated by weighting the minority's positionality on cardinal voting. In addition, it is possible to visualize the number and positionality of the minority from the analysis of the aggregation results. These results will be useful to promote mutual understanding between the majority and minority by interactively visualizing the contents of the proposed aggregation methods in the consensus-building process. With the further development of information technology, the consensus building based on big data will be necessary. We recommend the use of our proposed aggregation methods to make social choices for pluralistic values such as social, environmental, and economic.

Suggested Citation

  • Takeshi Kato & Yasuhiro Asa & Misa Owa, 2021. "Positionality-Weighted Aggregation Methods for Cumulative Voting," International Journal of Social Science Studies, Redfame publishing, vol. 9(2), pages 79-88, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:rfa:journl:v:9:y:2021:i:2:p:79-88
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://redfame.com/journal/index.php/ijsss/article/download/5171/5368
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://redfame.com/journal/index.php/ijsss/article/view/5171
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gotoh, Reiko, 2014. "The Equality of the Differences-Sen's Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice and Its Implications for Welfare Economics-," Economic Review, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 65(2), pages 140-155, April.
    2. David Quarfoot & Douglas Kohorn & Kevin Slavin & Rory Sutherland & David Goldstein & Ellen Konar, 2017. "Quadratic voting in the wild: real people, real votes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 283-303, July.
    3. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 328-328.
    4. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2017. "Efficient collective decision-making, marginal cost pricing, and quadratic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 45-73, July.
    5. Steven P. Lalley & E. Glen Weyl, 2018. "Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 108, pages 33-37, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Darcy W. E. Allen & Chris Berg & Aaron M. Lane & Jason Potts, 2020. "Cryptodemocracy and its institutional possibilities," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 33(3), pages 363-374, September.
    2. John C. Goodman & Philip K. Porter, 2021. "Will quadratic voting produce optimal public policy?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(1), pages 141-148, January.
    3. Takeshi Kato & Yasuhiro Asa & Misa Owa, 2020. "Positionality-Weighted Aggregation Methods for Cumulative Voting," Papers 2008.08759, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
    4. Davide Grossi, 2021. "Lecture Notes on Voting Theory," Papers 2105.00216, arXiv.org.
    5. Andrzej Baranski & Nicholas Haas & Rebecca Morton, 2020. "Majoritarian Bargaining over Budgetary Divisions and Policy," Working Papers 20200052, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Jul 2020.
    6. Crispin H. V. Cooper, 2020. "Quantitative Models of Well-Being to Inform Policy: Problems and Opportunities," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(8), pages 1-13, April.
    7. Leo Katz & Alvaro Sandroni, 2020. "Limits on power and rationality," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 507-521, March.
    8. Kenter, Jasper O. & Bryce, Rosalind & Christie, Michael & Cooper, Nigel & Hockley, Neal & Irvine, Katherine N. & Fazey, Ioan & O’Brien, Liz & Orchard-Webb, Johanne & Ravenscroft, Neil & Raymond, Chris, 2016. "Shared values and deliberative valuation: Future directions," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 21(PB), pages 358-371.
    9. María Gabriela Palacio, 2016. "Institutionalizing segregation: Conditional cash transfers and employment choices," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2016-91, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    10. Tetsuya, Saito, 2007. "Military Expenditures of Dictatorial Regimes: A Strategic Theory," MPRA Paper 6155, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Bhattacharya, Mihir & Gravel, Nicolas, 2021. "Is the preference of the majority representative ?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 87-94.
    12. António Osório, 2020. "Performance Evaluation: Subjectivity, Bias and Judgment Style in Sport," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 655-678, August.
    13. Nolan, Matt, 2018. "Horizontal and Vertical Equity in the New Zealand Tax-Transfer System: 1988-2013," Working Paper Series 7657, Victoria University of Wellington, Chair in Public Finance.
    14. Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris & Nicholas Ziros, 2021. "Vote Trading in Power-Sharing Systems: A Laboratory Investigation," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(636), pages 1849-1882.
    15. Nicola Acocella-super-, 2017. "The Rise And Decline Of Economic Policy As An Autonomous Discipline: A Critical Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 661-677, July.
    16. Darcy W. E. Allen & Chris Berg & Sinclair Davidson & Jason Potts, 2022. "On Coase and COVID-19," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 107-125, August.
    17. Antoinette Baujard, 2016. "Welfare economics," Chapters, in: Gilbert Faccarello & Heinz D. Kurz (ed.), Handbook on the History of Economic Analysis Volume III, chapter 42, pages 611-624, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Elchanan Mossel & Omer Tamuz, 2012. "Complete characterization of functions satisfying the conditions of Arrow’s theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(1), pages 127-140, June.
    19. Kenter, Jasper O., 2016. "Integrating deliberative monetary valuation, systems modelling and participatory mapping to assess shared values of ecosystem services," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 21(PB), pages 291-307.
    20. Bruno Frey, 1990. "From paradoxes to social rules, or: How economics repeats itself," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 27-34, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rfa:journl:v:9:y:2021:i:2:p:79-88. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Redfame publishing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cepflch.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.