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No sólo de mercado vive la democracia. El fenómeno del (in)cumplimiento al derecho y su relación con el desarrollo, la justicia y la democracia

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  • Mauricio García Villegas

    (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)

Abstract

This article analyzes the non compliance of the law in Latin America, particularly in Colombia. The core of the paper is the contrast between two different approaches: the strategic vision which argues that this failure is a consequence of the lack of institutional capacity to impose effective penalties; and the rebellion vision, which explains the failure as an expression of values or ideologies. The article examines the doctrinal roots related with the strategic vision – the social capital theories, studies in Law and economics and the new institutionalism – their reception in our environment and their application in the context of the judicial reform. This critical examination highlights the analytical differences between these two visions and their implications in the justice system and the social law: even though both visions are partial, each one of them is partly true. Compliance of law can not be achieved only by imposing sanctions and incentives, or by promoting a unilateral favorer attitude for compliance of the law. Rational behavior must also be complemented by the perception of the legitimacy of the institutions. Market and the democracy are both equally essential for the existence of a Rule of law.

Suggested Citation

  • Mauricio García Villegas, 2004. "No sólo de mercado vive la democracia. El fenómeno del (in)cumplimiento al derecho y su relación con el desarrollo, la justicia y la democracia," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 6(10), pages 95-134, January-J.
  • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:6:y:2004:i:10:p:95-134
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    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/mgarciav10.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Rowat, M. & Malik, W.H. & Dakolias, M., 1995. "Judicial Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean," Papers 280, World Bank - Technical Papers.
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    5. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    non compliance of the law; law and economics; legitimacy; development; justice; democracy; institutions; new institutionalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • K49 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Other

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