Economía política y finanzas públicas: teoría, evidencia y resultados de laboratorio
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More about this item
Keywords
experimental economics; public finances; fiscal deficit; principal-agent;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
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