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La autoridad macroprudencial: Poderes, alcance y rendición de cuentas

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  • Goodhart, Charles

Abstract

Ni el logro de la estabilidad de precios, ni la aplicación de supervisión microprudencial, condujeron a la estabilidad financiera general. Existe una brecha que necesita ser llenada por una autoridad macroprudencial (AMP), que debe tener los siguientes poderes: Modificar la composición de los activos del banco central; Ajustar márgenes (ratios) para influir en el comportamiento de la intermediación financiera; Proponer las enmiendas fiscales que afecten la intermediación financiera, y tener la obligación de comentar las propuestas que emanan de otras fuentes. Se argumenta que la AMP debe estar bajo la tutela del banco central, quien debe ocuparse de la prevención de la crisis de una manera operativamente independiente, mientras que la resolución de crisis debe ser responsabilidad del Tesoro. El problema se centra en cómo hacer que la AMP rinda cuentas. Se propone la adopción de un conjunto de “indicadores presuntos”, que al activarse requieran que la AMP tome medidas correctivas, o que explique por qué no sería necesario tomarlas.

Suggested Citation

  • Goodhart, Charles, 2013. "La autoridad macroprudencial: Poderes, alcance y rendición de cuentas," Revista Estudios Económicos, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, issue 25, pages 9-28.
    • Handle: RePEc:rbp:esteco:ree-25-01
    as

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    File URL: https://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Publicaciones/Revista-Estudios-Economicos/25/ree-25-goodhart.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Choy, Marylin & Chang, Giancarlo, 2014. "Medidas macroprudenciales aplicadas en el Perú," Revista Estudios Económicos, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, issue 27, pages 25-50.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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