IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/pts/journl/y2015i1p21-29.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Interventionism: An Economic Analysis Of Priceless Resource Allocation

Author

Listed:
  • Matei Alexandru APAVALOAEI

    (Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Romania)

Abstract

The present paper is going to build upon the Misesian theory of interventionism by presenting it in the light of property economics. We will argue that all forms of government interfere with the workings of the market can be counterfactually analysed by contrasting them with the voluntary order of laissez-faire capitalism. Interventionism is presented as a partial order, situated on the continuum between laissez-faire capitalism and socialism. The article argues that the limits of interventionism can be understood as a direct consequence of its functioning under the aegis of fiat property. Because the state can unilaterally decide the extent to which an individual is entitled to his private property (involuntary co-ownership), interventionism replaces the rational entrepreneurial order of the free market, which is constrained by the price structure and is directed by economic calculation, with the arbitrary value judgments of a single entity. This more general re-statement of the Misesian theory of interventionism from the point of view of property economics has the benefit of covering all possible policy measures while deducing the implications from an a priori perspective. From a methodological standpoint, this approach provides a more realist account of the implications of government involvement in the workings of the market as it does not require any unrealistic assumptions like: perfect information, equilibrium and dead weight loss comparison, or postulate a certain type of behaviour - benevolence, narrow self-interest or ideological error.

Suggested Citation

  • Matei Alexandru APAVALOAEI, 2015. "Interventionism: An Economic Analysis Of Priceless Resource Allocation," Scientific Bulletin - Economic Sciences, University of Pitesti, vol. 14(1), pages 21-29.
  • Handle: RePEc:pts:journl:y:2015:i:1:p:21-29
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://economic.upit.ro/repec/pdf/2015_1_3.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    3. George Stigler, 1972. "Economic competition and political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 91-106, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    2. Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra & Thierry Tressel, 2012. "A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 195-230.
    3. Yogesh Uppal, 2011. "Does legislative turnover adversely affect state expenditure policy? Evidence from Indian state elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 189-207, April.
    4. Chong, Alberto E. & Gradstein, Mark, 2007. "On the Determinants and Effects of Political Influence," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3347, Inter-American Development Bank.
    5. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2007. "Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 199-229, October.
    6. Robert Tollison, 2012. "The economic theory of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 73-82, July.
    7. Nikos Alabanos & Sotiris Theodoropoulos, 2016. "A key-point comparison & the new challenges for the existent Administrative Burden Models (A.B.M’s)," SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, University of Piraeus, vol. 66(1-2), pages 32-45, January-J.
    8. Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó, 2011. "Workers, Warriors, And Criminals: Social Conflict In General Equilibrium," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 646-677, August.
    9. Gawel, Erik & Lehmann, Paul & Strunz, Sebastian & Heuson, Clemens, 2018. "Public Choice barriers to efficient climate adaptation – theoretical insights and lessons learned from German flood disasters," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(3), pages 473-499, June.
    10. Rajan, Raghuram & Laeven, Luc & Klapper, Leora F., 2004. "Business Environment and Firm Entry: Evidence from International Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 4366, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Klapper, Leora & Laeven, Luc & Rajan, Raghuram, 2006. "Entry regulation as a barrier to entrepreneurship," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 591-629, December.
    12. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & Pablo Querubin & James A. Robinson, 2008. "When Does Policy Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 39(1 (Spring), pages 351-429.
    13. Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Introduction to the Political Economy of Environmental Regulations," RFF Working Paper Series dp-04-12, Resources for the Future.
    14. Franklin G. Mixon, 2018. "Camaraderie, common pool congestion, and the optimal size of surf gangs," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 381-396, November.
    15. Holcombe,Randall G., 2018. "Political Capitalism," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108449908, November.
    16. Philip Grossman, 1988. "Government and economic growth: A non-linear relationship," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 193-200, February.
    17. Li, Guoping & Zhou, Hong, 2015. "Political connections and access to IPO markets in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 76-93.
    18. Feng, Xunan & Johansson, Anders C. & Zhang, Tianyu, 2015. "Mixing business with politics: Political participation by entrepreneurs in China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 220-235.
    19. Diana W. Thomas, 2018. "A process perspective on regulation: Who bears the dispersed costs of regulation?," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 31(4), pages 395-402, December.
    20. Parsley, David & Faccio, Mara, 2006. "Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Political Connections," CEPR Discussion Papers 5460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Property economics; interventionism; fiat property.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B53 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Austrian
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pts:journl:y:2015:i:1:p:21-29. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alina Hagiu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fepitro.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.