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Accounting Fraud And Characteristics Of Company Executives: An Empirical Investigation

Author

Listed:
  • Maria BAXEVANI

    (Eastern Macedonia and Thrace Institute of Technology)

  • George MYLONAS

    (University of Sheffield)

Abstract

This study examines accounting fraud in relation to the characteristics of company executives. The study portrays the degree to which company as well as personal motives could urge an executive to commit fraud. Subsequently, we attempt to identify the degree to which certain socio-economic factors and the existence of strong internal audit mechanisms act as deterrence agents. Furthermore, we investigate the personal financial gain in relation to annual income as a motivator to commit fraud. Finally, we examine the optimal imprisonment duration as a deterrent and the overall probability to commit fraud. The research method was based in the distribution of a questionnaire and took place in the city of Thessaloniki and the region of West Macedonia and Thessaly. The participants were executives in the banking, financial and insurance sector. Our findings show that it is mostly personal factors that motivate an executive to commit fraud, but the fear of immediate legal sanctions and the existence of strong internal audit mechanisms are effective deterrence agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria BAXEVANI & George MYLONAS, 2014. "Accounting Fraud And Characteristics Of Company Executives: An Empirical Investigation," Scientific Bulletin - Economic Sciences, University of Pitesti, vol. 13(2), pages 31-42.
    • Handle: RePEc:pts:journl:y:2014:i:2:p:31-42
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    accounting fraud; company executives; incentives of fraud; imprisonment.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing

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