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The cost and benefit of banking regulations and controls, Chinese style

Author

Listed:
  • Xiaosheng Ju

    (School of Economics, Renmin University of China)

  • Dic Lo

    (School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, and Center of Research in Comparative Political Economy, Renmin University of China)

Abstract

The neoclassical approach focuses its attention on the prudence of individual banks. In its objective of achieving allocative efficiency, it seeks to prevent market failures caused by the operations of the banks. In this light, it is contended that China should further its market reforms in the direction of fostering the profit maximization cum risk minimization pursuit of individual banks. Meanwhile, the Keynesian-Schumpeterian-Minskyan approach focuses its attention on coping with systemic fragility. And systemic fragility is seen as endemic to the interaction between credit expansion and contraction, productive investment, and business profitability. In this light, even if it is indeed allocatively inefficient, Chinese finance can still have its advantages in terms of promoting productive efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiaosheng Ju & Dic Lo, 2012. "The cost and benefit of banking regulations and controls, Chinese style," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 65(263), pages 385-402.
    • Handle: RePEc:psl:pslqrr:2012:42
    as

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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/10195/10084
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Barth, James R. & Caprio, Gerard Jr. & Levine, Ross, 2004. "Bank regulation and supervision: what works best?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 205-248, April.
    4. Levine, Ross, 2002. "Bank-Based or Market-Based Financial Systems: Which Is Better?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 398-428, October.
    5. Samuel G. Hanson & Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, 2011. "A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 3-28, Winter.
    6. Dic Lo & Guicai Li & Yingquan Jiang, 2011. "Financial governance and economic development: making sense of the Chinese experience," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 64(258), pages 267-286.
    7. Jan Kregel, 2010. "Is This the Minsky Moment for Reform of Financial Regulation?," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_586, Levy Economics Institute.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    China; systemic fragility; allocative efficiency; productive efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E12 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

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