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Structural biases in prudential regulation of banks

Author

Listed:
  • Mario Tonveronachi

    (Università degli Studi di Siena, Dipartimento di economia politica, Siena)

Abstract

Paper originally published in the BNL Quarterly Review, vol. 54 n. 219, December 2001, pp. 341-353.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Tonveronachi, 2009. "Structural biases in prudential regulation of banks," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 62(248-251), pages 103-115.
    • Handle: RePEc:psl:pslqrr:2009:8
    as

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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/9445/9340
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kevin C. Murdock & Thomas F. Hellmann & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Roncaglia, 2009. "Rule, instability and crisis," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 62(248-251), pages 3-13.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial Crisis; Instability; Rules; Basel;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • N1 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations
    • B5 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches

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