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Regole di Basilea e modelli di vigilanza: quale convergenza? (Basel rules and supervisory models: What convergence?)

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  • Elisabetta Montanaro

    (Università degli Studi di Siena)

Abstract

The globalisation process that has interested the banking sector in the last decades was significantly fostered by the three founding pillars of the Basel framework: the home country control based on consolidated supervision, risk-sensitive prudential requirements, and the core principles for effective banking supervision. The present paper analyses whether the principle of the home country control is coherent with the large discretion with which national supervisors have implemented Basel’s prudential regulation. The complexity of global banks, too big to be supervised and resolved, inevitably generates regulatory coordination failures. The increasing mistrust of host countries in the ability and willingness of the home countries authorities to protect their national interests represents a serious threat to the sustainability of bank globalisation. An effective and binding convergence on the mechanisms and processes for managing and resolving the crises of cross-border banks seems destined to remain the unsolved problem of the Basel rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Elisabetta Montanaro, 2013. "Regole di Basilea e modelli di vigilanza: quale convergenza? (Basel rules and supervisory models: What convergence?)," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 66(264), pages 415-442.
  • Handle: RePEc:psl:moneta:2013:43
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Carlo D'Ippoliti, 2013. "Introduzione: L'Unione Europea e' "mammona" (Introduction: A Pansy European Union)," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 66(264), pages 377-395.
    2. Rainer Masera, 2013. "US Basel III Final Rule on banks' capital requirements: A different-size-fits-all approach," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 66(267), pages 387-402.
    3. Mario Tonveronachi, 2013. "L'Unione Bancaria Europea. Di nuovo un disegno istituzionale incompleto (The European banking union. An incomplete institutional design, again)," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 66(264), pages 397-413.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; home country control; Basel capital standards; cross-border banking crises;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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