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Debito estero e fragilità finanziaria nell’ottica dei paesi emergenti

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  • Mario Tonveronachi

    (Università degli Studi di Siena, Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Siena)

Abstract

In the wake of the minskian setting of financial fragility and its subsequent developments offered by Kregel, the paper addresses some basic aspects of the dynamics and management of external debt from the perspective of developing countries. In order to define the external fragility of a country reformulate the definition of Minsky of hedged positions, speculative, and Ponzi. The analysis of how, asymmetries in the external financial fragility, may affect the overall fragility leads to discuss the limits of the opening international financial. Finally, the distinction between internal and external financial fragility makes it possible to analyze how the dynamic interaction between economic units, including the government and its policies, can influence the distribution and the level of both types of fragility.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Tonveronachi, 2006. "Debito estero e fragilità finanziaria nell’ottica dei paesi emergenti," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 59(233), pages 45-72.
    • Handle: RePEc:psl:moneta:2006:13
    as

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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/monetaecredito/article/view/9747/9633
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2004. "Serial Default and the "Paradox" of Rich-to-Poor Capital Flows," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 53-58, May.
    2. Barry Eichengreen, 1991. "Historical Research on International Lending and Debt," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 149-169, Spring.
    3. Jan Kregel, 2004. "Can we create a stable international financial environment that ensures net resource transfers to developing countries?," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(4), pages 573-590.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Kregel; Minksy; fragilità finanziaria; debito estero ; paesi emergenti;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F4 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance

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