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La riforma del FMI: alcune questioni organizzatIve e operative

Author

Listed:
  • Hossein Askari

    (George Washington University, lnternational Business Department, Washington (USA))

  • Samir Chebil

    (World Bank, Washington (USA))

Abstract

While financial crises during the 1990s have started a lively debate on IMF policies toward member countries, reform of the Fund's organizational structure and operations have been largely ignored. Improved organization and operations would increase IMF efficiency and membership participation, which would in turn increase IMF effectiveness in enhancing global economic conditions. In this paper, a number of such issues--quotas, voting structure and decision making; executive board and ministerial committees; management structure and staff; political dimensions, transparency and credibility--are assessed.

Suggested Citation

  • Hossein Askari & Samir Chebil, 2000. "La riforma del FMI: alcune questioni organizzatIve e operative," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 53(209), pages 3-54.
    • Handle: RePEc:psl:moneta:2000:11
    as

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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/monetaecredito/article/view/10126/10010
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charles W. Calomiris, 1998. "The IMF's Imprudent Role As Lender of Last Resort," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 17(3), pages 275-294, Winter.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    IMF;

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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