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Le rôle des déficits publics dans la formation des taux d'intérêt

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  • Olivier Passet

Abstract

[fre] Les déficits publics ont-ils une forte influence sur les taux d'intérêt réels ? Ce point de vue a largement imprégné le discours politique et est étayé par un certain nombre de démonstrations empiriques. Il s'appuie sur des représentations théoriques selon lesquelles le niveau des taux d'intérêt réel est représentatif des déséquilibres entre épargne et investissement (ou de manière équivalente des déséquilibres sur le marché des biens). Mais cette interprétation suppose en outre que l'état, par son action discrétionnaire, modifie fortement l'équilibre du marché des capitaux et donc le taux d'intérêt. L'article qui suit n'a pas V ambition d'offrir une contradiction d'ordre théorique à cette thèse. Il cherche plutôt à inventorier un certain nombre d'anomalies factuelles qui contredisent la version selon laquelle la hausse puis la persistance d'un niveau élevé des taux d'intérêt seraient surtout imputables aux modifications exogènes des comportements d'épargne, en particulier publics. Trois types ď arguments sont avancés qui peuvent faire l'objet d'une lecture séparée : La première partie, souligne d'abord les limites de certaines démonstrations empiriques du lien entre déficit public et taux d'intérêt. Le simple examen des enchaînements financiers depuis 1960 permet de constater que les principales variations de taux d'intérêt {en premier lieu celle de 1979) précèdent en général de plusieurs années les inflexions les plus notables des comportements d'épargne. Cette chronologie ne facilite donc pas les interprétations qui partent de l'épargne, en tant que variable exogène, pour expliquer les taux. La seconde partie rappelle ensuite qu 'à court terme, dans le cas américain, la volatilité des taux longs réels au cours du cycle est relativement faible et peu corrélée avec les tensions sur le marché des biens ou l'évolution du déficit public. Enfin, dans le cas américain, une représentation alternative, certes aussi partielle que la précédente, peut être validée empiriquement : selon cette dernière, la formation des taux, relève (directement pour les taux courts, indirectement pour les taux longs) de la fonction de réaction de la Banque centrale. Les taux ne sont plus alors la résultante d'un mécanisme ď ajustement de marché, mais le fruit de la mise en œuvre d'une règle monétaire, qui à partir de la fin de 1979 incorpore notamment une cible d'inflation. Sous cette hypothèse, les déséquilibres entre épargne et investissement que certains interprètent comme exogènes au taux d'intérêt apparaissent avant tout liés au changement de priorité que se sont fixées les autorités monétaires en matière d'inflation. [eng] The rise in long term real interest rate is often ascribed to rising public deficits. This political conventional wisdom is supported by numerous empirical evidences. It is also in line with the theories according to which real interest rates are determined by equating saving to investment. Moreover, it implies that public authorities are supposed to be the driving- force which influences ex ante saving-investment equilibrium. The goal of this paper is not to engage a theoretical controversy. It rather looks to show empirical anomalies which are at variance with this view. The first part of the paper criticises some empirical evidences. A simple look on the financial chronology since 1960 shows that the main variations of real interest rates generally occur several years before those concerning saving behaviour. Such sequence is inconsistent with the point of view according to which interest rates are a consequence of exogenous variations of saving. The second part highlights the low cyclical volatility of real long term American interest rate. More generally, linkage between real long term interest rate and supply tensions or public deficit variations is tenuous. Finally, concerning the United-States, an other approach can be tested, according to which the monetary policy, contrary to the conventional wisdom, is an important factor behind the evolution of real interest rates. Short term interest rates are directly (and long term interest rates indirectly) determined by the reaction function of the central bank. Consequently interest rates are not the result of a pure market process. According to the following approach they are driven by a monetary rule which includes a price stability target since the end of 1979.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Passet, 1997. "Le rôle des déficits publics dans la formation des taux d'intérêt," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 62(1), pages 29-74.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1997_num_62_1_1466
    DOI: 10.3406/ofce.1997.1466
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ofce.1997.1466
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Hélène Baudchon, 1997. "Le modèle américain : « une reconversion réussie mais inachevée»," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 63(1), pages 93-142.

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