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Relations de crédit de long terme et structure des marchés bancaires locaux

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  • Nicolas Eber
  • Claude Jessua

Abstract

[eng] Long-term credit relationships and the structure of local banking markets. . This paper provides a spatial competition model of the banking sector, in which banks and firms can endure long-term relationships. We show that the fraction of borrowers with long-term contracts depends negatively on the number of banks. Considering sunk costs, we then show that the existence of long-term contracts leads to a decrease in the equilibrium number of banks. [fre] Cet article présente un modèle de concurrence spatiale du secteur bancaire, dans lequel les banques et les entreprises peuvent engager des relations de cré­dit de long terme. On montre que la proportion des emprunteurs ayant recours à des contrats de long terme dépend négativement du nombre de banques. En considérant l'existence de coûts fixes non récupérables, on montre ensuite que la présence de contrats de long terme dans l'économie implique un accroissement de la concentration du marché bancaire.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Eber & Claude Jessua, 1996. "Relations de crédit de long terme et structure des marchés bancaires locaux," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(3), pages 755-764.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1996_num_47_3_409813
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1996.409813
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1996.409813
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hannan, Timothy H., 1991. "Bank commercial loan markets and the role of market structure: evidence from surveys of commercial lending," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 133-149, February.
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    7. André Grimaud & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1994. "L'apport du modèle de concurrence monopolistique à l'économie bancaire," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 45(3), pages 715-726.
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    1. Hans Degryse & Steven Ongena, 2002. "Bank-Firm Relationships and International Banking Markets," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 401-417.
    2. Célestin Mayoukou & Pierre-Bruno Ruffini, 1998. "Are local banks special ? [Services bancaires de proximité : les banques locales sont-elles spéciales ?]," Post-Print hal-02353549, HAL.

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