Two-Period Financial Contracts with Private Information and Costly State Verification
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Cited by:
- Morales, María F., 2003.
"Financial Intermediation In A Model Of Growth Through Creative Destruction,"
Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(3), pages 363-393, June.
- Maria Fuensanta Morales, 2000. "Financial Intermediation in a Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0914, Econometric Society.
- Maria Fuensanta Morales, 2001. "Financial Intermediation in a Model of Growth through Creative Destruction," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 487.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Ahlin, Christian & Waters, Brian, 2016. "Dynamic microlending under adverse selection: Can it rival group lending?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 237-257.
- Jain, N. & Imai, S., 2015. "Dynamic Costly State Verification with Repeated Loans: a two-period analysis," Working Papers 13889, Department of Economics, City University London.
- Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa, 2003.
"Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume,"
Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 315-343, December.
- ATTAR, Andrea & CAMPIONI, Eloisa, 2003. "Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1712, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Antinolfi, Gaetano & Carli, Francesco, 2015.
"Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 105-119.
- Gaetano Antinolfi, 2012. "Costly Monitoring, Dynamic Incentives, and Default," 2012 Meeting Papers 892, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Philipp Meyer-Brauns, 2014. "Financial Contracting with Tax Evaders," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2014-01, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Catherine Refait, 2005.
"Soutien financier ou mise en faillite de l'entreprise? Comprendre la décision de la banque,"
Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 8(1), pages 131-157, March.
- Catherine Refait-Alexandre, 2005. "Soutien financier ou mise en faillite de l'entreprise ? Comprendre la décision de la banque," Post-Print hal-01391665, HAL.
- Meyer-Brauns, Philipp, 2014. "Financial Contracting with Tax Evaders," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100524, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Bhaumik, Sumon Kumar & Owolabi, Oluwarotimi & Pal, Sarmistha, 2018. "Private information, institutional distance, and the failure of cross-border acquisitions: Evidence from the banking sector in Central and Eastern Europe," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 504-513.
- Achim, Peter & Knoepfle, Jan, 2024.
"Relational enforcement,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
- Peter Wagner & Jan Knoepfle, 2021. "Relational Enforcement," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_295, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Rosa Ferrentino & Luca Vota, 2023. "The optimal financing of a conglomerate firm with hidden information and costly state verification," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 23-62, March.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/8559 is not listed on IDEAS
- Nicolas Eber & Claude Jessua, 1996. "Relations de crédit de long terme et structure des marchés bancaires locaux," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(3), pages 755-764.
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