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Révélation de la fonction de bien-être du politique et instabilité de la fonction de popularité

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  • Robert Marti

Abstract

[eng] The revelation of policy maker's objective function and the instability of popularity function. This article examines the problem of the instability of popularity functions. The assumption according to which economic agents use information efficiently is advanced. Endowed with rationality, the economic agent would be able to reveal policy makers' preferences and to compare them with the policy announced. The popularity function would then benefit from information on the degree of credibility of future political decisions. [fre] The revelation of policy maker's objective function and the instability of popularity function. . This article examines the problem of the instability of popularity functions. The assumption according to which economic agents use information efficiently is advanced. Endowed with rationality, the economic agent would be able to reveal policy makers'. .

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Marti, 1995. "Révélation de la fonction de bien-être du politique et instabilité de la fonction de popularité," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(3), pages 879-887.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_3_409701
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1995.409701
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1995.409701
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mueller, John E., 1970. "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson1," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(1), pages 18-34, March.
    2. Holbrook, Robert S, 1972. "Optimal Economic Policy and the Problem of Instrument Instability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(1), pages 57-65, March.
    3. Chow, Gregory C, 1973. "Problems of Economic Policy from the Viewpoint of Optimal Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(5), pages 825-837, December.
    4. André Gauron & Joël Maurice, 1980. "Des politiques économiques pour le VIIIe Plan : une exploration de l'ensemble des possibles," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 31(5), pages 894-929.
    5. Ulrich Camen & Hans Genberg & Michael Salemi, 1991. "Asymmetric monetary policies? the case of Germany and France," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 219-236, October.
    6. Jean-Dominique Lafay & Friedrich Schneider & Werner Pommerehne, 1981. "Les interactions entre économie et politique : synthèse des analyses théoriques et empiriques," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 32(1), pages 110-162.
    7. Carraro, Carlo, 1988. "The implicit objective function of Italian macroeconomic policy : 1963:1-1980:4," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 261-276, July.
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