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Réformer l'intermédiation financière en Russie : des options

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  • Laurence Scialom
  • Hélène Clément-Pitiot

Abstract

[eng] Reforming financial intermediation in Russia : the options . . The establishment in Russia of a decentralized resource-allocation system requires the urgent promotion of effective banking intermediation. It is urgent to consider what steps should be taken to promote a true financial intermediation. Any examination of the options must reconcile the theoretical approach to intermediation with Russian realities — which is what we propose to do. Our discussion will center on two major topics, the bilateral banking relationships and the organization of the banking system at a more macroeconomic level. On this basis we propose some guidelines for the reforms that should be implemented in the Russian Federation to introduce a genuine banking intermediation function. [fre] Réformer l' intermediation financière en Russie : des options. . La promotion d'un mode décentralisé d'allocation des ressources en Russie rend imperative la promotion d'une véritable intermédiation financière. Notre analyse en ce domaine concilie l'approche théorique en matière d'intermédiation et la prise en compte des réalités russes. Pour ce faire, nous organisons la réflexion autour de deux grands axes : les relations bancaires bilatérales et l'organisation du système bancaire à un niveau plus macro-économique. Sur cette base, nous proposons quelques pistes de réflexions quant à l'orientation des réformes à mettre en œuvre dans la Fédération de Russie pour promouvoir une véritable inter-médiation financière.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurence Scialom & Hélène Clément-Pitiot, 1995. "Réformer l'intermédiation financière en Russie : des options," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(2), pages 433-455.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_2_409653
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1995.409653
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1995.409653
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