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Information asymétrique et émission d'actifs

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  • Gabrielle Demange
  • Guy Laroque

Abstract

[fre] Information asymétrique et émission d'actifs. . On dit souvent que les informations privilégiées dont disposent les dirigeants d'entreprise découragent les investisseurs potentiels et réduisent le volume des échanges sur le titre. Nous étudions la validité de cet argument sous des hypothè­ses usuelles en finance, dans un modèle inspiré de Grossman-Stiglitz [1980]. [eng] Asymmetric information and the flotation of companies . . The privileged information that the owners have on their firms is often said to discourage rational financial investors and to thin the market for their shares. The paper studies the validity of this argument in a model similar to Grossman-Stiglitz [1980].

Suggested Citation

  • Gabrielle Demange & Guy Laroque, 1994. "Information asymétrique et émission d'actifs," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 45(3), pages 639-656.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1994_num_45_3_409554
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
    2. Franklin Allen, Douglas Gale, 1988. "Optimal Security Design," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(3), pages 229-263.
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    6. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
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