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Coopération et protection : nouveaux enjeux, nouvelles approches

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  • Bernard Guillochon

Abstract

[fre] Coopération et protection. Nouveaux enjeux, nouvelles approches. . Jusque dans les années soixante-dix, les négociations commerciales permettent l'abaissement des droits de douane, conformément à l'esprit des accords du GATT. Mais la période contemporaine est marquée par une intensification du protectionnisme, essentiellement non tarifaire. Dans ce contexte de guerre commerciale, le cycle d'Uruguay a fini par déboucher sur un accord abaissant certaines barrières et créant l'Organisation mondiale du commerce, censée permettre le retour à des pratiques loyales. La multiplication des obstacles dans les années quatre-vingt a suscité l'élaboration de modèles démontrant que les politiques commerciales peuvent apporter des gains par rapport au libre-échange lorsque existent des marchés imparfaits et/ou des économies d'échelle. Mais les conclusions de ces nouvelles théories restent en fait très dépendantes de la spé­cificité de leurs hypothèses et donnent peu d'indications sur les effets des interventions effectives. Aussi le choix en faveur du libre-échange apparaît, aux yeux de beaucoup d'économistes, aujourd'hui, comme la solution la plus simple et la plus sûre. [eng] Cooperation and protection : new stakes and new theories. . Until seventies, commercial rounds induce lowering of tariffs according to the text of the GATT. But during eighties, countries use non-tariff barriers to protect their industries from foreign competition. In spite of this commercial war, Uruguay Round has succeeded in getting lowerings of commercial barriers and in creating the World Organization of Trade which would be able to restore the fair trade. Owing to the new protectionism, new theories of commercial policy were elaborated, aiming at showing interventionism can be better than free trade, with imperfect competition and economies of scale. But conclusions of these models are strongly dependent of assumptions and do not give useful information on policies to undertake. For this reason, many economists prefer, to day, the solution of free trade.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernard Guillochon, 1994. "Coopération et protection : nouveaux enjeux, nouvelles approches," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 45(3), pages 475-486.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1994_num_45_3_409539
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1994.409539
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1994.409539
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406.
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