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Acceptabilité des réformes des politiques de gestion de l'eau [Cadre d'analyse et exemples]

Author

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  • Jean-Daniel Rinaudo
  • Sylvie Morardet

Abstract

[fre] Cet article propose un cadre d'analyse de l'acceptabilité des réformes des politiques de gestion de l'eau. Le problème de l'acceptabilité se manifeste au cours des trois principales phases du processus de réforme : lors de la formulation des objectifs; lors du choix des instruments à mettre en œuvre ; et lors de la phase d'application de ces choix. L'article montre, en s'appuyant sur des éléments théoriques et sur deux exemples (France et Pakistan) que la question de l'acceptabilité d'une réforme peut être ramenée à celle de sa faisabilité politique dans un contexte de décision centralisée ou à l'analyse du processus de négociation dans le cas d'une décision concertée. [eng] Analysing the acceptability of water policy reforms analytical framework and examples . This paper proposes a framework to analyse the acceptability of water policy reforms. It shows that the question of reform acceptability arises at three different stages of the reform process : during its design (definition of reform objectives and guidelines), its implementation (choice of policy instruments) and its enforcement. Using theoretical arguments and examples from two case studies (France and Pakistan), the paper shows that, according to the institutional context where the decision is taken (centralised or negotiated decision) the acceptability of a reform can be assessed through the analysis of its political feasibility or through the analysis of the negotiation process.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Daniel Rinaudo & Sylvie Morardet, 1999. "Acceptabilité des réformes des politiques de gestion de l'eau [Cadre d'analyse et exemples]," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 254(1), pages 36-44.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recoru:ecoru_0013-0559_1999_num_254_1_5137
    DOI: 10.3406/ecoru.1999.5137
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecoru.1999.5137
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard F. Kazmierczak & David W. Hughes, 1997. "Reasonable Value and the Role of Negotiation in Agriculture's Use of the Environment," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 19(1), pages 108-121.
    2. Adams, Gregory & Rausser, Gordon & Simon, Leo, 1996. "Modelling multilateral negotiations: An application to California water policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 97-111, July.
    3. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    4. Crosby, Benjamin L., 1996. "Policy implementation: The organizational challenge," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 24(9), pages 1403-1415, September.
    5. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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