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Fondements constitutionnels de l’indépendance des Banques centrales : des Pères fondateurs de la nation américaine à la Banque centrale européenne

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  • Étienne Farvaque

Abstract

[fre] Cette note s’interroge sur les fondements de l’indépendance des Banques centrales. Nous montrons que l’origine du principe d’indépendance provient de la philosophie politique américaine, qui considère l’indépendance comme une condition essentielle du maintien de la démocratie. Nous considérons ensuite les conséquences d’une telle filiation pour la légitimité de la Banque centrale européenne. . Classification JEL : E58, N20 [eng] Constitutional foundations of central bank independence : from the Founding Fathers to the European Central Bank . This note considers the foundations of central bank independence. It is shown that the origin of the principle comes from the American political philosophy. In this context, independence is an essential working condition for a perennial democracy. We afterward consider the consequences of such heredity for the European Central Bank’s legitimacy. . JEL classification : E58, N20

Suggested Citation

  • Étienne Farvaque, 2007. "Fondements constitutionnels de l’indépendance des Banques centrales : des Pères fondateurs de la nation américaine à la Banque centrale européenne," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 87(1), pages 225-239.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2007_num_87_1_4245
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2007.4245
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2007.4245
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative

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