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Typologie des déterminants des primes d’offres publiques et validation empirique à partir des notices d’opération

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  • Côme Segretain

Abstract

[fre] Cet article traite des facteurs expliquant le niveau des primes d’offres publiques offertes, en confrontant les avancées de la littérature aux résultats obtenus. Trois domaines de causalité sont dégagés : les gains de l’opération pour l’offreur, le processus d’enchères, les conflits d’agence. Il ressort que : . - la prime est fortement corrélée au potentiel de progression du titre signalé par les analystes. Mais ni les notions de prime de contrôle et de synergies, ni le mode de paiement de l’opération n’ont d’impact net dans notre échantillon ; . - la compétition entre offreurs est une variable fondamentale sur le niveau de la prime. Si elle déclenche des enchères, la prime s’apprécie considérablement. En revanche, ni le prépositionnement de l’offreur au capital de la cible, ni l’accord des dirigeants de la cible ne permettent de réduire la prime ; . - la taille de la cible est significativement et négativement corrélée avec la prime. . Classification JEL : G32, G34, G12, G31 [eng] Explaining tender offer premiums with French data . This research focuses on tender offer premiums, which compare the price paid by the bidder to pre-bid target share prices. It reviews previous researches on factors influencing premium level, such as gains for the bidder (synergies, target valuation), bidding process (% held by the bidder, target board agreement, competition), conflicts between management and shareholders (Hubris hypothesis, management shareholding). French data collected between 1995 and 2002 on 126 tender offers bring several findings. Premiums are highly linked to target price analyst’s forecasts, when available. Competition between bidders is of major impact, however bidders have no mean to avoid it by the level of the first offer. At last, target size reduces the premium offered. On the other hand, impact of synergies and of the 50% bidder shareholding threshold haven’t been confirmed. Thus, there is no takeover premium in data. Neither cash versus stock nor unsolicited versus friendly distinctions are effective. . JEL classification : G32, G34, G12, G31

Suggested Citation

  • Côme Segretain, 2005. "Typologie des déterminants des primes d’offres publiques et validation empirique à partir des notices d’opération," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 81(4), pages 189-209.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2005_num_81_4_4019
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2005.4019
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2005.4019
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies

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