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Salaire de réserve, allocation chômage dégressive et revenu minimum d'insertion

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  • Laurence Rioux

Abstract

[ger] Eine schlecht vergütete Beschäftigung wird nur schwer akzeptiert, auch wenn der angebotene Lohn nicht der einzige Grund für deren Ablehnung ist. Der Begriff "Reservelohn" spiegelt diesen Umstand wider : der Reservelohn einesArbeitslosen, der ais der Mindestlohn, unterhalb dessen der Arbeitslose ein Arbeitsangebot ablehnt, definiert wird, spielt bei der Überwindung der Arbeitslosigkeit eine wichtige Rolle. Über die Reservelöhne liegen aber nur wenige unmittelbare Informationen vor. In Frankreich werden die Arbeitslosen nur im Rahmen zweier INSEE-Erhebungen über den Mindeststundenlohn befragt, den sie verlangen, um eine Beschäftigung anzunehmen. Die Arbeitslosen, die den Mindestlohn für die Eingliederung beziehen, haben einen niedrigeren Reservelohn ais die anderen Arbeitslosen : zwei von drei verlangen höchstens den garantierten Mindeststundenlohn um zu arbeiten, wahrend zwei Drittel der anderen Arbeitslosen mindestens den garantierten Mindeststundenlohn fordern. Des Gleichen akzeptieren die Empfanger des Mindestlohns zur Eingliederung, die eine Arbeit finden, wesentlich niedrigere Löhne ais die anderen Arbeitslosen. Mit der Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit nimmt der Reservelohn ab. Aber diese Absenkung ist begrenzt, bei den Empfangern des Mindestlohns zur Eingliederung noch starker ais bei den anderen Arbeitslosen. Bei den Auswirkungen der Dauer der Arbeits-losigkeit auf den Reservelohn gibt es keine nennens-werten Unterschiede zwischen den Arbeits-Iosen, die eine Beschäftigung finden, und denjenigen, die ohne Arbeit bleiben : der Reservelohn ersterer hat kaum mehr abgenommen ais derjenige letzterer. [eng] Although the wages offered are not the only possible reason for refusing a job, a poorly paid job is harder to accept. The "reservation wage" concept explains this fact. A jobseeker's reservation wage, defined as the minimum wage below which he will refuse a job offer, plays an important role in leaving unemployment. Yet it is rare to find direct information on reservation wages. In France, there are only two INSEE surveys that ask jobseekers about the minimum hourly wage they would require to accept a job. Jobseekers receiving minimum integration income have a lower reservation wage than other jobseekers. Twothirds of them would ask for at most the minimum wage to work, whereas two-thirds of the other jobseekers would ask for at least the minimum wage. Similarly, minimum integration income recipients who find a job accept much lower wages than other jobseekers. The reservation wage decreases with the length of the period of unemployment. Yet this decrease is limited, more so for minimum integration income recipients than for other jobseekers. Lastly, the effect of the length of unemployment on the reservation wage does not markedly differentiate jobseekers who find a job from those who remain unemployed. The former do not drop their reservation wage much more than the latter. [fre] Même si le salaire proposé n’est pas le seul motif de refus possible, un emploi mal rémunéré est plus difficilement accepté. La notion de «salaire de réserve» rend compte de ce fait: le salaire de réserve d’un chômeur, défini comme le salaire minimal en dessous duquel ce chômeur refuse une offre d’emploi, joue un rôle important dans la sortie du chômage. Or l’information directe sur les salaires de réserve est rare. En France, seules deux enquêtes de l’Insee interrogent les chômeurs sur le salaire horaire minimal qu’ils demandent pour accepter un emploi. Les chômeurs au RMI ont un salaire de réserve plus faible que les autres chômeurs: deux sur trois demandent au plus le Smic horaire pour travailler, alors que les deux tiers des autres chômeurs demandent au moins le Smic horaire. De même, les allocataires du RMI qui trouvent un emploi acceptent des salaires beaucoup plus faibles que les autres chômeurs. Le salaire de réserve baisse quand l’épisode de chômage se prolonge. Mais cette baisse est limitée, encore plus pour les allocataires du RMI que pour les autres chômeurs. Enfin, l’effet de l’ancienneté au chômage sur le salaire de réserve ne distingue pas sensiblement les chômeurs qui trouvent un emploi de ceux qui restent au chômage: les premiers ont à peine plus révisé à la baisse leur salaire de réserve que les seconds. [spa] Aunque el salario propuesto no sea el unico motive posible de rechazo, un empleo mal remuneradoes diffcilmente aceptado. La nocion de « salario de reserva » pone de manifiesto esta tendencia : el salario de reserva de un desempleado, definido como el salario minimo sin el cual este desempleado rechaza una oferta de empleo, juega un papel importante en la salida dei desempleo. Ahora bien, la informacion directa sobre los salarios de reserva es escasa. En Francia, solo dos encuestas dei Insee interrogan a los desempleados sobre el salario horario minimo que exigen para aceptar un empleo. Los desempleados que cobran el RMI (renta minima de insercion) tienen un salario de reserva menor que los demis desempleados : dos de cada tres exigen a todo lo mas el salario minimo horario para trabajar, mientras que las dos terceras partes de los demas desemple ados piden al menos el salario minimo horario. Los beneficiarios dei RMI que encuentran un empleo aceptan unos salarios muy inferiores a los de los demas desempleados. El salario de reserva baja cuando el episodio de paro se alarga. Pero esta baja es reducida, y mas para los beneficiarios dei RMI que para los demas desempleados. En fin, el efecto de antiguedad en el paro sobre el salario de reserva no distingue mucho a los desempleados que encuentran un empleo de los que permanecen en el paro : aquéllos apenas han bajado su salario de reserva en comparacion con éstos.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurence Rioux, 2001. "Salaire de réserve, allocation chômage dégressive et revenu minimum d'insertion," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 346(1), pages 137-160.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_2001_num_346_1_7437
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.2001.7437
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.2001.7437
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ortega, Javier & Rioux, Laurence, 2010. "On the extent of re-entitlement effects in unemployment compensation," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 368-382, April.
    2. Michel-Pierre Chélini & Georges Prat, 2019. "Verständnis der langfristigen Dynamik von Arbeitslosigkeit und Löhnen in Frankreich [Understanding the Long Run Dynamics of French Unemployment and Wages]," Post-Print hal-04400810, HAL.

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