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Les "droits à polluer" aux États-Unis

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  • Sylviane Gastaldo

Abstract

[fre] Les "droits à polluer" aux Etats-Unis . La réglementation américaine en matière d'environnement est particulièrement sévère. Pour la rendre plus flexible et moins coûteuse tout en respectant globalement un objectif de qualité de l'environnement, le législateur a institué des "marchés de droits à polluer". Ils permettent, sous certaines conditions, des échanges de droits à polluer : chaque centre pollueur peut alors arbitrer entre le coût de la lutte contre la pollution et le prix d'un permis ou droit à polluer. . Aux Etats-Unis, cette politique de répartition et de réduction des coûts de la pollution a porté sur l'eau, l'air et la présence de plomb dans l'essence. L'expérience n'a été vraiment concluante que dans ce dernier domaine : la réglementation des échanges de droits était souple et les raffineurs étaient habitués à négocier entre eux. . Dans le domaine de la pollution atmosphérique, les amendements de la loi de 1990 (Clean Air Act) renforcent les marchés de droits en étendant les échanges de permis à de nouveaux polluants, comme le dioxyde de soufre. [eng] "Marketable Emission Permits" in the United States . American environmental regulations are particularly strict. Legislators have introduced "emissions trading markets" in order to make these regulations more flexible and less expensive while respecting an environmental quality goal overall. These markets allow the trading of emissions permits on certain terms. Each polluting centre can therefore choose between the cost of fighting pollution and the price of a pollution right or marketable permit. . In the United States, this policy to distribute and reduce the cost of pollution concentrated on water, air and the presence of lead in petrol. The experiment was only really conclusive in this last area as regulations concerning the emissions trading were flexible and the refiners were used to negotiating with each other. . In the area of atmospheric pollution, amendments to the 1990 Clean Air Act have strengthened marketable permit markets by extending emissions trading to new pollutants such as sulphur dioxide. [spa] Los "derechos a la contaminaciôn" en los Estados Unidos . La reglamentaciôn norteamericana en materia de medio ambiente es particularmente severa. Para hacerla mâs flexible y menos costosa respetando globalmente un objetivo de calidad del medio ambiente, el legislador instituyô "mercados de derechos a la contaminaciôn". Permiten bajo ciertas condiciones, intercambios de derechos a la contaminaciôn : cada centro de contaminaciôn puede asi arbitrar entre el costo de la lucha contra la contaminaciôn y el precio de una autorizaciôn o derecho a la contaminaciôn. . En los Estados Unidos, esta polîtica de reparticiôn y de reducciôn de los costos de la contaminaciôn ha sido orientada hacia el agua, el aire y la presencia de plomo en la gasolina. La experiencia no ha sido realmente concluyente mâs que en ese ultimo âmbito : la reglementaciôn de los intercambios de derechos era flexible y los refinadores estaban acostumbrados a negociar entre ellos. . En el àrea de la contaminaciôn atmosférica, las enmiendas de la ley de 1 990 {Clean Air Act ) refuerzan los mercados de derechos al extender los intercambios de autorizaciones a nuevos contaminantes, como el diôxido de azufre.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylviane Gastaldo, 1992. "Les "droits à polluer" aux États-Unis," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 258(1), pages 35-41.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1992_num_258_1_5690
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.1992.5690
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.1992.5690
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tietenberg, T H, 1990. "Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 6(1), pages 17-33, Spring.
    2. Cropper, Maureen L & Oates, Wallace E, 1992. "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 675-740, June.
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    2. Ezio Micelli, 2002. "Development Rights Markets to Manage Urban Plans in Italy," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 39(1), pages 141-154, January.

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