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Choix de mécanismes incitatifs dans les contrats agri-environnementaux

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  • Alban Richard
  • Michel Trommetter

Abstract

[eng] The choice of incentive mechanisms in agri-environmental contracts by Alban Richard and Michel Trommetter . In the light of economic and environmental objectives, agri-environmental measures seek the incentive mechanism best suited to reduce the level of negative externalities or to generate positive externalities in farms. The objective of this paper is to build a model of the interaction between public authorities and farmers. This model of the sequential-behaviour type (possibility of revising some decisions), indispensable for tackling dynamic interactions between governmental decisions and farmers, by making allowance for unforeseen events and for a learning process in the course of the contract. The simulations show the respective influence of the variables, in the model, on the optimal level of incentive for heterogeneous farmers. [fre] Choix de mécanismes incitatifs dans les contrats agri-environnementaux par Alban Richard et Michel Trommetter . Fondées sur des objectifs économiques et environnementaux, les mesures agri-environnementales recherchent les meilleures modalités d'incitation dans les exploitations agricoles pour réduire le niveau des externalités négatives ou générer des externalités positives. L'objectif de ce papier est de construire un modèle d'interaction, entre les pouvoirs publics et des agriculteurs, basé sur des modèles de comportement séquentiels (possibilité de réviser certaines décisions) permettant d'intégrer les multiples aléas et les apprentissages réalisés au cours du contrat. Les simulations permettent de déterminer l'importance respective des variables du modèle sur le niveau d'incitation optimal, lorsque les agriculteurs sont hétérogènes.

Suggested Citation

  • Alban Richard & Michel Trommetter, 2000. "Choix de mécanismes incitatifs dans les contrats agri-environnementaux," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 145(4), pages 145-155.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_145_4_6120
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.2000.6120
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2000.6120
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