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Politique européenne d'exportation de céréales et comportements des opérateurs : une analyse économétrique des adjudications de restitutions

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  • Jean-Marc Bourgeon
  • Yves Le Roux

Abstract

[ger] Die europäische Politik des Getreideexports und die Verhaltensweisen der M arktteilnehmer: eine ökonometrische Analyse der Ausschreibungen von Ausfuhrerstattungen, . von Jean-Marc Bourgeon, Yves Le Roux.. . Ein Großteil der europäischen Getreideausfuhrerstattungen wird durch Ausschreibungen zugeteilt. Wir benutzen die Theorie der Übergebote, um das Verhalten der Marktteilnehmer zu modellieren, die bei den wöchentlichen Ausschreibungen von Interventionsbeständen an Weichweizen tätig werden. Die optimalen Angebotsstrategien der Beteiligten werden unter zwei einander gegenübergestellten Hypothesen hinsichtlich der Bewertung des Getreides durch die Marktteilnehmer ermittelt und geschätzt. Jede dieser Hypothesen entspricht einer besonderen Funktionsweise des Getreideweltmarktes und der verwandten Märkte. Der benutzte strukturelle Ansatz ermöglicht die Schlußfolgerung, daß die Verhaltensweisen der Beteiligten durch eine einheitliche Referenz auf dem Weltmarkt bestimmt werden und daß das Verfahren zur Zuteilung der Exportsubventionen effizient ist. [eng] The European Grain Export Policy and Operator Behaviour: An Econometric Analysis of Refund Tenders, . by Jean-Marc Bourgeon and Yves Le Roux.. . European grain export refunds are largely attributed by tendering procedures. The auction theory is used to model the behaviour of operators who take part in weekly tenders for soft wheat intervention stocks. The agents'optimal supply strategies are specified and estimated using two different hypotheses as to the evaluation of the grains by the operators. Each of these hypotheses corresponds to a particular mode of operation on the world grain and related markets. The structural approach adopted produces the conclusion that agent behaviour is dictated by a single reference on the world market and that the procedure for allocating export subsidies is efficient. [fre] Politique européenne d'exportation de céréales et comportements des opérateurs : une analyse économétrique des adjudications de restitutions, . par Jean-Marc Bourgeon, Yves Le Roux.. . Une grande partie des restitutions à l'exportation de céréales européennes est attribuée par des procédures d'adjudications. Nous utilisons la théorie des enchères pour modéliser le comportement des opérateurs qui interviennent lors des adjudications hebdomadaires de stocks d'intervention de blé tendre. La spécification et l'estimation des stratégies d'offre optimales des agents sont menées sous deux hypothèses contrastées quant à l'évaluation des céréales par les opérateurs. Chacune de ces hypothèses correspond à un type particulier de fonctionnement du marché mondial des céréales et des marchés connexes. L' approche structurelle utilisée nous permet de conclure que les comportements des agents sont dictés par une référence unique sur le marché mondial, et que la procédure d'attribution des subventions à l'exportation est efficace. [spa] Política europea de exportación de cereales y compoitamientos de los operadores : un análisis econométrico de las adjudicaciones de restituciones, . por Jean-Marc Bourgeon, Yves Le Roux.. . Una gran parte de las restituciones a la exportación de cereales europeos está atribuida por procedimientos de adjudicación. Utilizamos la teoría de las licitaciones para hacer un modelo del comportamiento de los operadores que intervienen en las adjudications semanales de stocks de intervención de trigo candeal. La especificación y la estimación de las estrategias de oferta óptimas de los agentes se llevan bajo dos hipótesis contrastadas en cuanto a la evaluación de los cereales por los operadores. Cada una de esas hipótesis corresponde a un tipo particular de funcionamiento del mercado mundial de los cereales y de los mercados conexos. El enfoque estructural utilizado nos permite concluir que los compoitamientos de los agentes están dictados por una referencia única en el mercado mundial, y que el procedimiento de atribución de los subsidios a la exportación es eficaz.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Yves Le Roux, 1995. "Politique européenne d'exportation de céréales et comportements des opérateurs : une analyse économétrique des adjudications de restitutions," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 117(1), pages 31-48.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1995_num_117_1_5712
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1995.5712
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1995.5712
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bernard Elyakime & Patrice Loisel, 1997. "Asymétrie dans des enchères à prix de retrait secret," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(4), pages 835-851.

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