IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prg/jnlpol/v2014y2014i2id947p216-231.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Hodnota statku kolektivní spotřeby
[Value of Collective Consumption Goods]

Author

Listed:
  • Beáta Mikušová Meričková
  • Jan Stejskal

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to develop the theoretical framework of the public goods provision. This theoretic contribution is based on the critical analysis of mainstream economics theories dealing with public goods as market failure (neoclassical economics and neoliberalism) and on the results of own economic experiment examining the "free-riding" behaviour in the voluntary provision of public goods. The "free rider" problem is one of the main reasons for government intervention in the market. However, there is an inefficiency of public decision making on public provision and financing of selected goods because of the estimating goods values (ex-post consumer utility) problem. Moreover, the results of economic experiments do not support the pure "free rider" theory. However, the economic experiment simulates the real public good consumption that is why this paper contains also the survey of consumers' willingness to pay for specific public goods (public library services) in real terms based on the methodology of contingent valuation method.

Suggested Citation

  • Beáta Mikušová Meričková & Jan Stejskal, 2014. "Hodnota statku kolektivní spotřeby [Value of Collective Consumption Goods]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2014(2), pages 216-231.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2014:y:2014:i:2:id:947:p:216-231
    DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.947
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://polek.vse.cz/doi/10.18267/j.polek.947.html
    Download Restriction: free of charge
    File URL: http://polek.vse.cz/doi/10.18267/j.polek.947.pdf
    Download Restriction: free of charge
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.18267/j.polek.947?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 1997. "Classroom Games: Voluntary Provision of a Public Good," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 209-215, Fall.
    2. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-955, December.
    3. Jitka Šeneklová & Jiří Špalek, 2009. "Jsou ekonomové jiní? Ekonomický model versus realita [Are economists different? economic model]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2009(1), pages 21-45.
    4. Mark Isaac, R. & McCue, Kenneth F. & Plott, Charles R., 1985. "Public goods provision in an experimental environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 51-74, February.
    5. Howard R. Bowen, 1943. "The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 58(1), pages 27-48.
    6. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226320625 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Kamil Galuscak & Jan Pavel, 2012. "Taxes and Benefits: Work Incentive Effects of Policies," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 62(1), pages 27-43, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ochrana František & Hrnčířová Kristýna, 2015. "Does the Lowest Bid Price Evaluation Criterion Make for a More Efficient Public Procurement Selection Criterion? (Case of the Czech Republic)," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 8(1), pages 41-59, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Grigoriadis, Theocharis, 2017. "Religion, administration & public goods: Experimental evidence from Russia," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 42-60.
    2. Jiří Špalek & Zuzana Berná, 2011. "Threshold Effectiveness in Contributing to the Public Goods: Experiments Involving Czech Students," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2011(3), pages 250-267.
    3. Ledyard, John O., "undated". "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Working Papers 861, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    4. Sour, Laura & Gutiérrez Andrade, Miguel Ángel, 2011. "Los incentivos extrínsecos y el cumplimiento fiscal [Extrinsic incentives and tax compliance]," MPRA Paper 66066, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Quirmbach, Herman C. & Swenson, Charles W. & Vines, Cynthia C., 1996. "An experimental examination of general equilibrium tax incidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 337-358, September.
    6. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider, 1996. "A Revelation Approach To Optimal Taxation," Public Finance Review, , vol. 24(4), pages 439-463, October.
    7. Sánchez, Isabel, 1991. "La provision voluntaria de bienes publicos: Resultados Experimentales," DE - Documentos de Trabajo. Economía. DE 3000, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    8. Jitka Šeneklová & Jiří Špalek, 2009. "Jsou ekonomové jiní? Ekonomický model versus realita [Are economists different? economic model]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2009(1), pages 21-45.
    9. T. Ahn & Rick Wilson, 2010. "Elinor Ostrom’s contributions to the experimental study of social dilemmas," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(3), pages 327-333, June.
    10. Sour, Laura, 2006. "Cumplimiento fiscal y bienes públicos: ¿Son realmente compatibles? [Tax Compliance & Public Goods: Do they really get along?]," MPRA Paper 50447, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Markus C. Arnold & Eva Ponick, 2006. "Kommunikation im Groves-Mechanismus — Ergebnisse eines Laborexperiments," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 89-120, February.
    12. Robert Roßner & Dimitrios Zikos, 2018. "The Role of Homogeneity and Heterogeneity Among Resource Users on Water Governance: Lessons Learnt from an Economic Field Experiment on Irrigation in Uzbekistan," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 4(03), pages 1-30, July.
    13. Andreas Löschel & Dirk Rübbelke, 2014. "On the Voluntary Provision of International Public Goods," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 81(322), pages 195-204, April.
    14. Fangfang Tan, 2008. "Punishment in a Linear Public Good Game with Productivity Heterogeneity," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 269-293, September.
    15. Lange, Andreas & Ross, Johannes, 2024. "Internalizing match-dependent externalities," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 218(C), pages 356-378.
    16. Bruno Broseta & Enrique Fatas & Tibor Neugebauer, 2003. "Asset Markets and Equilibrium Selection in Public Goods Games with Provision Points: An Experimental Study," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(4), pages 574-591, October.
    17. Simon Gächter & Lingbo Huang & Martin Sefton, 2016. "Combining “real effort” with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(4), pages 687-712, December.
    18. Don Coursey, 1987. "Markets and the measurement of value," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 291-297, October.
    19. James C. Cox & Vjollca Sadiraj, 2018. "Incentives," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2018-01, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    20. Christopher M. Anderson & Daniel S. Holland, 2006. "Auctions for Initial Sale of Annual Catch Entitlement," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 82(3), pages 333-352.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    public goods; public goods values (ex-post consumer utility); free rider theory; economic experiment; willingness to pay;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2014:y:2014:i:2:id:947:p:216-231. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Stanislav Vojir (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/uevsecz.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.