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Teoretické a ekonomické aspekty pojištění vkladů
[Theoretical and Economic Aspects of Deposit Insurance]

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  • Zbyněk Revenda

Abstract

The paper deals with deposit insurance schemes as an integral part of the present system of the banking regulation. Insurance premiums, limits and the rates of compensation and consequences of deposit insurance are then discussed from the theoretical and practical points of view. The moral hazard of banks and depositors and adverse selection are the main undesirable accompanying effects, which are directly connected with the scale of insurance protection in banks. The European Union unifi es the rules of compensation. However, data analysis shows that there are still differences in the levels of protection because of different averages in deposits per household. Some possible alternatives to depositor protection in banks are also analyzed. Although deposit insurance is accompanied by problems, it is the best form of depositor protection.

Suggested Citation

  • Zbyněk Revenda, 2013. "Teoretické a ekonomické aspekty pojištění vkladů [Theoretical and Economic Aspects of Deposit Insurance]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2013(2), pages 149-170.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2013:y:2013:i:2:id:892:p:149-170
    DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.892
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David C. Wheelock & Paul W. Wilson, 1994. "Can deposit insurance increase the risk of bank failure? Some historical evidence," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 57-71.
    2. Schoenmaker, Dirk & Gros, Daniel, 2012. "A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund," CEPS Papers 6918, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    3. Steven Russell, 1993. "The government's role in deposit insurance," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan, pages 3-34.
    4. Schoenmaker, Dirk & Gros, Daniel, 2012. "A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund - An Update," CEPS Papers 7276, Centre for European Policy Studies.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zbyněk Revenda, 2014. "Pomoc ohroženým bankám - teorie, realita a měnové dopady [Assistance to Troubled Banks - Theory, Reality and Monetary Implications]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2014(2), pages 270-288.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    European Union; information asymmetry; Deposit Insurance; adverse selection; bank regulation and supervision; bank run; contagion risk; free banking; guarantee fund; insurance premiums; moral hazard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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