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The Importance of Direct Democracy Tools for the Quality of Political Competition at the National and Local Levels
[Význam nástrojů přímé demokracie pro kvalitu politické konkurence na národní i lokální úrovni]

Author

Listed:
  • Petr Chmelík

Abstract

Quality of political competition is the essential answer to the question of how people's wishes can be represented and coordinated in the public sphere in the most effective way. The paper defines the forms of political competition on political markets and shows referenda and initiatives as means to stabilize political business cycles and to break politicians' coalitions against the voters by destroying their monopoly on agenda setting and decision-making and by shrinking the informational advantage of the "classe politique" and well-organized interest groups. The mentioned positive effects on the quality of political competition can be demonstrated at both the national and local levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Petr Chmelík, 2009. "The Importance of Direct Democracy Tools for the Quality of Political Competition at the National and Local Levels [Význam nástrojů přímé demokracie pro kvalitu politické konkurence na národní i lo," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2009(5), pages 70-88.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlaop:v:2009:y:2009:i:5:id:284:p:70-88
    DOI: 10.18267/j.aop.284
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic policy; direct democracy; Political-business cycle; Rent seeking behaviour;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H - Public Economics

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