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PSPAB: Privacy-preserving average procurement bidding system with double-spending checking

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  • Li Li
  • Jiayong Liu
  • Peng Jia
  • Rongfeng Zheng

Abstract

Several organizations use auctions in a procurement bidding system to maintain a low procurement cost. Although several privacy-preserving auction solutions for different application scenarios have been proposed over the past few decades, none of them can perform efficient average procurement bidding while ensuring strong privacy protection for the bids of suppliers. To address this problem, we propose PSPAB, a lightweight, secure average procurement bidding system based on cryptographic tools, to provide full privacy for bids. In addition, this system allows the procurement manager to identify the users in the case of double spending. We formally prove the security of PSPAB under a semi-honest adversary model. Experimental results validate the theoretical analysis and practical application of PSPAB in real-world scenarios.

Suggested Citation

  • Li Li & Jiayong Liu & Peng Jia & Rongfeng Zheng, 2020. "PSPAB: Privacy-preserving average procurement bidding system with double-spending checking," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(10), pages 1-17, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0240548
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0240548
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Francesco Decarolis, 2018. "Comparing Public Procurement Auctions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 391-419, May.
    2. Milica Milutinovic & Andreas Put & Bart De Decker, 2015. "An Efficient, Anonymous and Unlinkable Incentives Scheme," International Journal of Information Security and Privacy (IJISP), IGI Global, vol. 9(3), pages 1-20, July.
    3. Wei-Shiun Chang & Bo Chen & Timothy C. Salmon, 2015. "An Investigation of the Average Bid Mechanism for Procurement Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(6), pages 1237-1254, June.
    4. Gian Luigi Albano & Milo Bianchi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2006. "Bid Average Methods in Procurement," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 96(1), pages 41-62, January-F.
    5. Timothy G. Conley & Francesco Decarolis, 2016. "Detecting Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 1-38, May.
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