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Mating First, Mating More: Biological Market Fluctuation in a Wild Prosimian

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  • Ivan Norscia
  • Daniela Antonacci
  • Elisabetta Palagi

Abstract

In biology, economics, and politics, distributive power is the key for understanding asymmetrical relationships and it can be obtained by force (dominance) or trading (leverage). Whenever males cannot use force, they largely depend on females for breeding opportunities and the balance of power tilts in favour of females. Thus, males are expected not only to compete within their sex-class but also to exchange services with the opposite sex. Does this mating market, described for humans and apes, apply also to prosimians, the most ancestral primate group? To answer the question, we studied a scent-oriented and gregarious lemur, Propithecus verreauxi (sifaka), showing female dominance, promiscuous mating, and seasonal breeding. We collected 57 copulations involving 8 males and 4 females in the wild (Berenty Reserve, South Madagascar), and data (all occurrences) on grooming, aggressions, and marking behaviour. We performed the analyses via exact Spearman and matrix correlations. Male mating priority rank correlated with the frequency of male countermarking over female scents but not with the proportion of fights won by males over females. Thus, males competed in an olfactory tournament more than in an arena of aggressive encounters. The copulation frequency correlated neither with the proportion of fights won by males nor with the frequency of male countermarking on female scents. Male-to-female grooming correlated with female-to-male grooming only during premating. Instead, in the mating period male-to-female grooming correlated with the copulation frequency. In short, the biological market underwent seasonal fluctuations, since males bargained grooming for sex in the mating days and grooming for itself in the premating period. Top scent-releasers gained mating priority (they mated first) and top groomers ensured a higher number of renewed copulations (they mated more). In conclusion, males maximize their reproduction probability by adopting a double tactic and by following market fluctuations.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivan Norscia & Daniela Antonacci & Elisabetta Palagi, 2009. "Mating First, Mating More: Biological Market Fluctuation in a Wild Prosimian," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 4(3), pages 1-6, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0004679
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0004679
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John M. McNamara & Zoltan Barta & Lutz Fromhage & Alasdair I. Houston, 2008. "The coevolution of choosiness and cooperation," Nature, Nature, vol. 451(7175), pages 189-192, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wei Wei & XiaoGuang Qi & Paul A Garber & SongTao Guo & Pei Zhang & BaoGuo Li, 2013. "Supply and Demand Determine the Market Value of Access to Infants in the Golden Snub-Nosed Monkey (Rhinopithecus roxellana)," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(6), pages 1-9, June.
    2. Fruteau, C., 2010. "Biological markets in the everyday lives of mangabeys and vervets : An observational and experimental study," Other publications TiSEM 3f4fc3e2-723d-4455-9ed2-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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