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Autocratic, Democratic, and Optimal Government

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  • Niskanen, William A

Abstract

All types of government face two major fiscal decisions: the level of government services and the average tax rate. This paper develops models of autocratic, democratic, and optimal government. The effects of alternative government structures are estimated using a common set of parameters based on U.S. data. Output and government services are higher in a democracy than in an autocracy, but the tax rate is lower. Output is even higher with an optimal government and both government services and the tax rate are lower. The relative outcomes in any government depend strongly on the fiscal horizon of those who govern. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Niskanen, William A, 1997. "Autocratic, Democratic, and Optimal Government," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 464-479, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:35:y:1997:i:3:p:464-79
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Roessler, 2019. "Political regimes and publicly provided goods: why democracy needs development," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 301-331, September.
    2. Thomas Bernauer & Vally Koubi, 2013. "Are bigger governments better providers of public goods? Evidence from air pollution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 593-609, September.
    3. Casey B. Mulligan & Ricard Gil & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2004. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 51-74, Winter.
    4. Abu S. Shonchoy, 2016. "Political Institutions, Governance, And Consumption Expenditure In Developing Countries: A Panel Data Analysis," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(4), pages 710-728, October.
    5. Jennis J. BISER & Jeffrey A. EDWARDS, 2012. "Civil Liberties and Access to Water: Analysis of 193 Countries," Applied Econometrics and International Development, Euro-American Association of Economic Development, vol. 12(1).
    6. Mulligan, Casey B. & Tsui, Kevin K., 2015. "Political entry, public policies, and the economy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 377-397.
    7. Mulligan Casey B & Gil Ricard & Sala-i-Martin Xavier X, 2010. "Social Security and Democracy," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-46, March.
    8. Dörffel, Christoph & Freytag, Andreas, 2023. "The poverty effect of democratization," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
    9. R. Coats, 2006. "Autocratic, Democratic, and Optimal Government: Fiscal Choices and Economic Outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 233-237, October.
    10. Robert T. Deacon & Sarani Saha, 2006. "Public Good Provision by Dictatorship: A Survey," Chapters, in: Attiat F. Ott & Richard J. Cebula (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Public Economics, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Michael Ross, 2006. "Is Democracy Good for the Poor?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(4), pages 860-874, October.
    12. Fambeu, Ariel Herbert & Yomi, Patricia Tchawa, 2023. "Is democracy pro poor in Sub-Saharan Africa?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 10-30.
    13. Karim Khan & Anwar Shah, 2019. "Dictatorships, Patronage and Public Good Provision: Some Empirics," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 58(3), pages 239-264.
    14. Christoph Doerffel, 2021. "The Poverty Effect of Democratization: Disaggregating Democratic Institutions," Jena Economics Research Papers 2021-018, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    15. Shonchoy, Abu S., 2010. "Determinants of government consumption expenditure in developing countries : a panel data analysis," IDE Discussion Papers 266, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
    16. Ryan H. Murphy, 2019. "Governance and the dimensions of autocracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 131-148, June.
    17. De Luca, Giacomo & Litina, Anastasia & Sekeris, Petros G., 2015. "Growth-friendly dictatorships," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 98-111.
    18. William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg & William Mertens, 2004. "International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 29-51, March.
    19. Ramos, Antonio P. & Flores, Martin J. & Ross, Michael L., 2020. "Where has democracy helped the poor? Democratic transitions and early-life mortality at the country level," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 265(C).

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