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Independent Fiscal Institutions As A Tool Of Fiscal Governance

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  • Ryta Dziemianowicz

    (University in Bialystok, Poland)

Abstract

The recent economic crisis, one of the symptoms of which is a sudden increase of public debt in the majority of OECD countries, again made the government and the society aware of the necessity for conducting transparent, but also responsible fiscal policy. Creating a framework of the fiscal discipline responsible fiscal policy started to be perceived as an essential condition of effective governance leading to reduce budget deficit and public debt. The independent fiscal institutions may be included into regulations supporting public finance management. Their fundamen-tal aim is to reduce the related risk of conducting the irresponsible fiscal policy, monitoring it, controlling deficit and assessing long-term effects of government action in this area. The purpose of this article is to present independent fiscal insti-tutions and evaluate their usefulness in enhancing the effectiveness of the fiscal policy and stabilizing public finance. Experiences of the EU and OECD countries were used in the analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryta Dziemianowicz, 2014. "Independent Fiscal Institutions As A Tool Of Fiscal Governance," Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy, Institute of Economic Research, vol. 9(1), pages 59-70, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:pes:ierequ:v:9:y:2014:i:1:p:59-70
    DOI: 10.12775/EQUIL.2014.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    5. Robert P. Hagemann, 2010. "Improving Fiscal Performance Through Fiscal Councils," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 829, OECD Publishing.
    6. Lars Calmfors, 2011. "The Role of Independent Fiscal Policy Institutions," CESifo Working Paper Series 3367, CESifo.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Comăniciu Carmen, 2017. "The Fiscal Councils – Independent Fiscal Institutions for Ensuring Fiscal Discipline," Ovidius University Annals, Economic Sciences Series, Ovidius University of Constantza, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 0(2), pages 531-536, December.
    2. Cristina VLAD & Birol IBADULA & Petre BREZEANU, 2018. "Tax Harmonization in Fiscal Competitiveness Context," Finante - provocarile viitorului (Finance - Challenges of the Future), University of Craiova, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 1(20), pages 45-52, November.
    3. Patrícia Martins & Leonida Correia, 2021. "Fiscal institutions: different classifications and their effectiveness," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 11(1), pages 159-190, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal policy; fiscal discipline; fiscal council; fiscal transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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