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National central banks in EMU: time for revision?

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  • Marijn van der Sluis

    (Maastricht University)

Abstract

The national central banks of the euro area are crucial to the monetary policy of the euro. Their Governors sit (on a personal title) on the Governing Council of the ECB, and they execute most of the monetary policies. Whereas the recent ruling by the German Constitutional Court on the Public Sector Purchases Program highlighted the uncomfortable role of the German Bundesbank in between national and EU law, the euro-crisis already showed other legal strains on the position of the national central banks in Economic and Monetary Union. This article argues that EMU empowered national central banks, even when it took away their power to individually set monetary policies for their respective Member States. The euro-crisis then disturbed the balance struck in the construction of the ECB between protecting national interests and effective decision-making, resulting in several legal problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Marijn van der Sluis, 2022. "National central banks in EMU: time for revision?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(1), pages 19-30, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:jbkreg:v:23:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1057_s41261-021-00175-z
    DOI: 10.1057/s41261-021-00175-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ingrid Ettl & Anita Roitner, 2024. "25 years of the OeNB in the Eurosystem – tracing the evolution of Governing Council governance," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue Q4/23, pages 79-92.

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