IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/pal/jbkreg/v19y2018i4d10.1057_s41261-017-0059-7.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Was Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies effective?

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Nataf

    (Vrije Universiteit Brussel)

  • Lieven Moor

    (Vrije Universiteit Brussel)

  • Rosanne Vanpée

    (KU Leuven)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is (1) to put the Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies (henceforth, CRA I) into historical perspective, including a comparison with the Dodd–Frank Act, and (2) to examine whether the CRA I Regulation effectively influenced the ratings issued by credit rating agencies in EU financial markets. This paper presents a historical review of regulations existing prior to the 2007 crisis and describes the mechanisms put in place after the event both in the USA and the EU. Following this part, two ordered logistic regressions based on a sample of ratings attributed to Eurozone companies examine the influence of CRA I on the rating process. A study of the repercussions of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on ‘false warnings’ issued by rating agencies is finally presented in the last section of this paper. The regressions point out that CRA I had a double impact on how rating agencies use financial, accounting and geographical indicators during the rating process, as it influenced (1) the grading process and (2) the magnitude of the up- or downgrades. It is also underlined in this study that the regulation had no significant influence on ‘false warnings’. The findings of this study may help EU regulators to better design future regulations on rating agencies and to curb weaknesses of CRA I that were not addressed by ‘CRA II’ (2011) and ‘CRA III’ (2013) regulations. To our knowledge, this paper is the first one to examine the efficiency of the CRA I regulation and to adopt a European-oriented approach by focusing on Eurozone members.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Nataf & Lieven Moor & Rosanne Vanpée, 2018. "Was Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies effective?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 19(4), pages 299-316, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:jbkreg:v:19:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1057_s41261-017-0059-7
    DOI: 10.1057/s41261-017-0059-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1057/s41261-017-0059-7
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1057/s41261-017-0059-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lawrence J. White, 2006. "Good Intentions Gone Awry: A Policy Analysis of the SEC's Regulation of the Bond Rating Industry," NFI Policy Briefs 2006-PB-05, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    2. He, Qi-Ming & Chao, Xiuli, 2014. "A tollbooth tandem queue with heterogeneous servers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 236(1), pages 177-189.
    3. Becker, Bo & Milbourn, Todd, 2011. "How did increased competition affect credit ratings?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 493-514, September.
    4. Steven Scalet & Thomas Kelly, 2012. "The Ethics of Credit Rating Agencies: What Happened and the Way Forward," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 111(4), pages 477-490, December.
    5. Rasha Alsakka & Owain ap Gwilym & Patrycja Klusak & Vu Tran, 2015. "Market Impact under a New Regulatory Regime: Credit Rating Agencies in Europe," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 44(2), pages 275-308, July.
    6. Dimitrov, Valentin & Palia, Darius & Tang, Leo, 2015. "Impact of the Dodd-Frank act on credit ratings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 505-520.
    7. Jakob De Haan & Fabian Amtenbrink, 2011. "Credit Rating Agencies," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 19, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Vink, Dennis & Nawas, Mike & van Breemen, Vivian, 2021. "Security design and credit rating risk in the CLO market," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    2. Wenming Xu & Yan Liu, 2021. "Does reputational capital affect credit rating agencies?: empirical evidence from a natural experiment in China," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 433-468, June.
    3. Keser, Claudia & Özgümüs, Asri & Peterlé, Emmanuel & Schmidt, Martin, 2017. "An experimental investigation of rating-market regulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 78-86.
    4. Sahibzada, Irfan Ullah & Rizwan, Muhammad Suhail & Qureshi, Anum, 2022. "Impact of sovereign credit ratings on systemic risk and the moderating role of regulatory reforms: An international investigation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    5. Kraft, Pepa & Xie, Yuan & Zhou, Ling, 2020. "The intraday timing of rating changes," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    6. Huang, He & Svec, Jiri & Wu, Eliza, 2021. "The game changer: Regulatory reform and multiple credit ratings," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    7. Deng, Kaihua & Qiao, Guannan, 2022. "Triple A default," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    8. Baghai, Ramin P. & Becker, Bo, 2018. "Non-rating revenue and conflicts of interest," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 94-112.
    9. repec:mth:ijafr8:v:9:y:2019:i:1:p:209-228 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Michael R. King & Steven Ongena & Nikola Tarashev, 2020. "Bank Standalone Credit Ratings," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(4), pages 101-144, September.
    11. Jones, Laurence & Alsakka, Rasha & ap Gwilym, Owain & Mantovan, Noemi, 2022. "Regulating rating agencies: A conservative behavioural change," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    12. Bedendo, Mascia & Cathcart, Lara & El-Jahel, Lina, 2018. "Reputational shocks and the information content of credit ratings," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 44-60.
    13. Sumit Agarwal & Vincent Y. S. Chen & Weina Zhang, 2016. "The Information Value of Credit Rating Action Reports: A Textual Analysis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(8), pages 2218-2240, August.
    14. Wei Tian & Xiangyun Zhou & Yixiang Tian & Wei Meng, 2020. "Short-term competition and long-term convergence between domestic and global rating agencies: Evidence from China," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(5), pages 1-15, May.
    15. Leo Tang & Marietta Peytcheva & Pei Li, 2020. "Investor-Paid Ratings and Conflicts of Interest," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 163(2), pages 365-378, May.
    16. Alessio Piccolo & Joel Shapiro, 2022. "Credit Ratings and Market Information," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(10), pages 4425-4473.
    17. Samuel B. Bonsall & Kevin Koharki & Pepa Kraft & Karl A. Muller & Anywhere Sikochi, 2023. "Do Rating Agencies Behave Defensively for Higher Risk Issuers?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4864-4887, August.
    18. Attig, Najah & Driss, Hamdi & El Ghoul, Sadok, 2021. "Credit ratings quality in uncertain times," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    19. Abad, Pilar & Ferreras, Rodrigo & Robles, M-Dolores, 2019. "Informational role of rating revisions after reputational events and regulation reforms," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 91-103.
    20. Goergen, Marc & Gounopoulos, Dimitrios & Koutroumpis, Panagiotis, 2021. "Do multiple credit ratings reduce money left on the table? Evidence from U.S. IPOs," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    21. Yuriy Zabolotnyuk, 2018. "Wealth Effects of Bond Rating Announcements," Multinational Finance Journal, Multinational Finance Journal, vol. 22(3-4), pages 211-254, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:jbkreg:v:19:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1057_s41261-017-0059-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.