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A Model of an Oligopoly in an Insurance Market

Author

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  • Mattias K. Polborn

    (Seminar für Versicherungswissenschaft, University of Munich, Ludwigstr. 28, 80539 München, Germany.)

Abstract

This article analyzes the behavior of an oligopoly of risk-averse insurers that insure many consumers facing identical independent risks; however, the probability of a loss is ex ante not known with certainty. It is shown that there is a continuum of equilibria in the Bertrand game. The most plausible equilibrium can be obtained by requiring that all insurers are content with the number of policies they sell given the equilibrium premium. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1998) 23, 41–48. doi:10.1023/A:1008677913887

Suggested Citation

  • Mattias K. Polborn, 1998. "A Model of an Oligopoly in an Insurance Market," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 23(1), pages 41-48, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:genrir:v:23:y:1998:i:1:p:41-48
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    Cited by:

    1. Xuelian Li & Shiu-Chieh Chiu & Jyh-Horng Lin & Yuxin Xie, 2024. "Assessing insurer guarantee cover and risk retention toward SDG 3: a structure-break down-and-out call valuation," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-10, December.
    2. Boonen, Tim J. & Pantelous, Athanasios A. & Wu, Renchao, 2018. "Non-cooperative dynamic games for general insurance markets," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 123-135.
    3. Julien Hardelin & Sabine Lemoyne de Forges, 2012. "Raising Capital in an Insurance Oligopoly Market," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 37(1), pages 83-108, March.
    4. José Daniel López-Barrientos & Ekaterina Viktorovna Gromova & Ekaterina Sergeevna Miroshnichenko, 2020. "Resource Exploitation in a Stochastic Horizon under Two Parametric Interpretations," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(7), pages 1-29, July.
    5. Asmussen, Søren & Christensen, Bent Jesper & Thøgersen, Julie, 2019. "Nash equilibrium premium strategies for push–pull competition in a frictional non-life insurance market," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 92-100.
    6. Radoslav Raykov, 2014. "Uncertain Costs and Vertical Differentiation in an Insurance Duopoly," Staff Working Papers 14-14, Bank of Canada.
    7. Hofmann, Annette & Nell, Martin, 2008. "The impact of intermediary remuneration in differentiated insurance markets," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 22, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
    8. Claire Mouminoux & Christophe Dutang & Stéphane Loisel & Hansjoerg Albrecher, 2022. "On a Markovian Game Model for Competitive Insurance Pricing," Methodology and Computing in Applied Probability, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 1061-1091, June.
    9. Radoslav Raykov, 2015. "Catastrophe insurance equilibrium with correlated claims," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 78(1), pages 89-115, January.
    10. Yi, Minli & Yang, Yang & Lin, Jyh-Horng, 2021. "Affiliated reinsurance and insurer performance under capital regulation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 39(C).
    11. Li, Xuelian & Lin, Panpan & Lin, Jyh-Horng, 2020. "COVID-19, insurer board utility, and capital regulation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(C).
    12. Dutang, Christophe & Albrecher, Hansjoerg & Loisel, Stéphane, 2013. "Competition among non-life insurers under solvency constraints: A game-theoretic approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 231(3), pages 702-711.
    13. Wambach, Achim, 1999. "Bertrand competition under cost uncertainty," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(7), pages 941-951, October.
    14. Mahito Okura, 2014. "The Value of Demand Information in an Insurance Market Under Demand and Cost Uncertainty," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 42(4), pages 413-426, December.
    15. Chen, Shi & Yang, Yang & Lin, Jyh-Horng, 2020. "Capped borrower credit risk and insurer hedging during the COVID-19 outbreak," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(C).
    16. Søren Asmussen & Bent Jesper Christensen & Julie Thøgersen, 2019. "Stackelberg Equilibrium Premium Strategies for Push-Pull Competition in a Non-Life Insurance Market with Product Differentiation," Risks, MDPI, vol. 7(2), pages 1-23, May.
    17. Lin, Jyh-Horng & Li, Xuelian & Lin, Panpan, 2022. "Could we rely on credit swap hedging as a substitute for insurer blockchain technology involvement?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 266-281.

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