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The Spread of Free-Riding Behavior in a Social Network

Author

Listed:
  • Dunia López-Pintado

    (Departamento de Economía, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Sevilla, Spain.)

Abstract

We propose a model where agents located in a social network decide whether or not to exert effort to provide a local public good. We assume that they have strong incentives to free-ride on their neighbors’ effort decisions. We characterize the equilibria of the induced game. We also study a mean-field dynamics in which agents choose in each period the best response to the last period's decisions of their neighbors. We characterize the fraction of free-riders in the stable state of such a dynamics and show how it depends on properties of the degree distribution. Eastern Economic Journal (2008) 34, 464–479. doi:10.1057/eej.2008.30

Suggested Citation

  • Dunia López-Pintado, 2008. "The Spread of Free-Riding Behavior in a Social Network," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 34(4), pages 464-479.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:easeco:v:34:y:2008:i:4:p:464-479
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    Cited by:

    1. López-Pintado, Dunia, 2008. "Diffusion in complex social networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 573-590, March.
    2. Luca Dall’Asta & Paolo Pin & Abolfazl Ramezanpour, 2011. "Optimal Equilibria of the Best Shot Game," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(6), pages 885-901, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C45 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Neural Networks and Related Topics
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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