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Reconciliaciones y estrategias de oferta en el mercado mayorista de electricidad de Colombia
[Reconciliations and bid strategies in the Colombian wholesale electricity market]

Author

Listed:
  • Carabalí, Jaime

    (Universidad ICESI (Colombia))

  • Perez, Alex

    (Banco de la República (Cali, Colombia))

  • Meneses, Luis Ángel

    (Universidad Cooperativa de Colombia (Colombia))

  • Rojas, Libardo

    (Universidad ICESI (Colombia))

Abstract

En este trabajo estudiamos la relación entre las reconciliaciones en el mercado eléctrico colombiano y los precios ofertados por las firmas en la Bolsa de Energía. Asimismo, proponemos un modelo de comportamiento de la firma para elaborar predicciones teóricas sobre la relación entre las reconciliaciones y los precios ofertados. Posteriormente, desarrollamos una estrategia empírica para probar las predicciones de nuestro modelo. Encontramos que cuando las firmas esperan que sus unidades tengan reconciliaciones negativas en el día siguiente, estas tienden a reducir los precios ofertados por sus unidades. Con relación a las reconciliaciones positivas no se encuentra evidencia de alguna relación.

Suggested Citation

  • Carabalí, Jaime & Perez, Alex & Meneses, Luis Ángel & Rojas, Libardo, 2023. "Reconciliaciones y estrategias de oferta en el mercado mayorista de electricidad de Colombia [Reconciliations and bid strategies in the Colombian wholesale electricity market]," Revista de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa = Journal of Quantitative Methods for Economics and Business Administration, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Quantitative Methods for Economics and Business Administration, vol. 35(1), pages 57-79, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:pab:rmcpee:v:35:y:2023:i:1:p:57-79
    DOI: https://doi.org/10.46661/revmetodoscuanteconempresa.6058
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ali Hortaçsu & Steven L. Puller, 2008. "Understanding strategic bidding in multi‐unit auctions: a case study of the Texas electricity spot market," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 86-114, March.
    2. Catherine D. Wolfram, 1998. "Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 703-725, Winter.
    3. Green, Richard J & Newbery, David M, 1992. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 929-953, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    mercado de electricidad; bolsa de energía; estrategias de oferta; reconciliaciones; electricity market; spot market; bid strategies; reconciliations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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