IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ozl/journl/v14y2011i1p1-14.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A loglinear tax and transfer function: majority voting and optimal rates

Author

Listed:
  • John Creedy

    (Victoria University of Wellington and Melbourne University)

  • Solmaz Moslehi

    (Monash University)

Abstract

This paper explores the use of a loglinear tax and transfer function, displaying increasing marginal and average tax rates along with a means-tested transfer payment. The two parameters are a break-even income threshold, where the average tax rate is zero, and a tax parameter equivalent to the marginal tax rate at the break-even income level. When combined with Cobb-Douglas utility, the resulting labour supply is fixed and independent of the individual’s wage rate. For an additive social welfare function involving the sum of logarithms of (indirect) utilities, a convenient expression is available for the optimal tax rate in a framework in which individuals differ only in the wage rate they face. It is shown that a unique optimal rate exists, which depends on the preference for consumption and the inequality of wage rates. This coincides with the majority voting equilibrium rate. As with the linear tax function, higher inequality is associated with choice of a higher tax rate.

Suggested Citation

  • John Creedy & Solmaz Moslehi, 2011. "A loglinear tax and transfer function: majority voting and optimal rates," Australian Journal of Labour Economics (AJLE), Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre (BCEC), Curtin Business School, vol. 14(1), pages 1-14.
    • Handle: RePEc:ozl:journl:v:14:y:2011:i:1:p:1-14
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ftprepec.drivehq.com/ozl/journl/downloads/AJLE141creedy.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hersoug, Tor, 1984. "Union Wage Responses to Tax Changes," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(1), pages 37-51, March.
    2. John Creedy & Norman Gemmell, 2006. "Modelling Tax Revenue Growth," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 4073.
    3. Hodler, Roland, 2008. "Leisure and redistribution," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 354-363, June.
    4. Waterson, Michael, 1985. "On Progressive Taxation and Risk-taking," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(3), pages 510-519, September.
    5. Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December.
    6. Creedy, John & McDonald, Ian M, 1992. "Income Tax Changes and Trade Union Wage Demands," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(58), pages 47-57, June.
    7. Creedy, John, 1979. "Income averaging and progressive taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 387-397, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. John Creedy and Solmaz Moslehi, 2010. "A Loglinear Tax and Transfer Function:," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1112, The University of Melbourne.
    2. Ilja Neustadt & Peter Zweifel, 2009. "Economic Well-Being, Social Mobility, and Preferences for Income Redistribution: Evidence from a Discrete Choice Experiment," SOI - Working Papers 0909, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Jan 2010.
    3. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    4. Acheson, Jean & Lawless, Martina & Lawlor, Donough & Tarrant, Oisín & Weymes, Laura, 2021. "Responsiveness of corporation tax revenues to taxable income: A firm-level approach," Papers WP715, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    5. Joseph E. Mullat, 2001. "Judging Social Welfare Policy with the Solving of the Bargaining Problem," Public Economics 0112007, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 04 Mar 2006.
    6. Aronsson, Thomas & Wikström, Magnus, 2011. "Optimal Tax Progression: Does it Matter if Wage Bargaining is Centralized or Decentralized?," Umeå Economic Studies 829, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    7. Imrohoroglu, Ayse & Merlo, Antonio & Rupert, Peter, 2000. "On the Political Economy of Income Redistribution and Crime," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 1-25, February.
    8. repec:zbw:bofrdp:1994_003 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Lourdes ROJAS RUBIO, 2022. "Inequality, Corruption and Support for Democracy," THEMA Working Papers 2022-20, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    10. Georges Casamatta & Helmuth Cremer & Philippe De Donder, 2010. "Repeated electoral competition over nonlinear income tax schedules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(4), pages 535-574, October.
    11. Dan Anderberg, 2007. "Inefficient households and the mix of government spending," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 127-140, April.
    12. Michael Kremer, 1997. "Why are Worker Cooperatives So Rare?," NBER Working Papers 6118, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Creedy, John & Moslehi, Solmaz, 2009. "Modelling the composition of government expenditure in democracies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 42-55, March.
    14. ,, 2009. "Strategy-proofness and single-crossing," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 4(2), June.
    15. Richard C. Barnett & Joydeep Bhattacharya & Helle Bunzel, 2014. "Voting For Income-Immiserizing Redistribution In The Meltzer–Richard Model," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(2), pages 682-695, April.
    16. Azarnert, Leonid V., 2010. "Immigration, fertility, and human capital: A model of economic decline of the West," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 431-440, December.
    17. Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2016. "Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 18-31.
    18. Dorsch, Michael T. & Maarek, Paul, 2020. "Economic downturns, inequality, and democratic improvements," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    19. John Creedy, 2010. "Personal Income Tax Structure: Theory and Policy," Chapters, in: Iris Claus & Norman Gemmell & Michelle Harding & David White (ed.), Tax Reform in Open Economies, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    20. Timothy Besley, 2017. "Aspirations and the political economy of inequality," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 1-35.
    21. Mitra, Tapan & Ok, Efe A. & Kockesen, Levent, 1998. "Popular support for progressive taxation and the relative income hypothesis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 69-76, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Welfare and Poverty; Taxation and Subsidies; Fiscal Policies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ozl:journl:v:14:y:2011:i:1:p:1-14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sandie Rawnsley (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/becurau.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.